

道德律與無上命令：意志與行動之間

康德與費希特

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一、「我」的出現/主權形式——

費希特的教育理念讓我們看到國家如何可以藉由民族國家之意志來塑造人民，此治理技術的著力點在於深刻地影響人們的思想與意志，引發人民對於共同社會秩序圖式的呼應，而自動自發的行動。費希特強調，意志是人的根本，教育需要從根本建立果斷而不屈不撓的性格，使人在勸誡之前，已經可以自發的處於一個必然的固定位置之上，不會猶豫不決。他認為，要塑造此確實可靠、堅定不移的意志，就需要透過驅使人行動的「愛」，並且需要設定一種「直接指向單純的善本身、以善自身為目的的愛」，來取代「自愛」(23)。這種「單純的善」，會以「實際存在之前就浮現於精神面前的圖像」出現，並且會引發「愉悅之情」，使得受到此愉悅之情感動之人，都會自動自發的朝向善而行動。這種圖像是由人自動造成的。

費希特此處提出的以「單純的善」為驅動力的教育模式，正是康德所討論的作為無上命令的道德律。此驅動力超越自愛與個人幸福(*self-love and private happiness*)，因為每個人的感受性不同，對不同人而言，愉快或是痛苦具有不同的意義，這些感覺都建立於對物體的不同看法，而無法建立具有普世價值的實踐原則(228)。康德強調，實踐的法則是「意志是絕對而立即的被客觀決定」(*the will is objectively determined absolutely and immediately*)。這個基本法則以一種綜合的先驗模式強而有力地向我們展現(238)。這個受到先驗模式驅動的意志，使人面對不得不然的迫切性。而且，此迫切性使其自發而自主地完成行動，不會猶豫(241)。所謂不得不然，或是「無上命令」(*categorical imperative*)，就是我們所認定的具有普世意義的最高客觀價值，無論我們的慾望與目的何在，我們都必須去執行——“*Thou shall*” 模式(225-6)。

康德所討論的，便是從「先驗法則/道德律——意志——判斷——自由自主自發的行動」的法則。

這個道德的命令式，使我們必須依照此先驗圖式而出現，完成自己，成為自己。這也就是巴岱伊所討論的「我」的「應該」如此出現的歷史形成以及焦慮。這個「應該」如此出現的道德感，與「存有」之間，有巨大的差距。¹我的形成以及

¹ “What exists as profound existence liberated from the forms of *appearance*? Most often the hasty and ill-considered answer is given as if the question *what is there that is imperative? (what is the moral value)* and not *what exists?* had been posed. (“Sacrifices,” *Visions of Exces: Selective Writings*,

其背後的命令式，是在歷史條件中形成的，但是這個「我」卻只是知識的對象。這個要取得主宰權的「我」以一種暴力操控了空無，但是，這種操控卻是充滿焦慮的。²正如巴岱伊所說，人之構成是以無數分裂的微粒子組成，社會亦然。人的內在分裂，可以有如外科手術一般，帶有撕裂性的暴力。「我」之內必然有「他者」，這個「他者」是無數個具有異質性的「我」。而企圖採取主控位置的絕對命令式的「我」，卻將這些異質成分的「我」拋離驅逐。正因為這種根本的匱乏與分裂狀態，所以當任何「主體」要以絕對命令式的整體狀態主控情勢，便會攜帶著具有威脅力的壯麗，以更為暴力的方式投射於此黑暗虛無之中（“Labyrinth,” *Vision of Excess*, 176）。這種投射的基礎，便是建立於尋求與無條件而絕對存在的神聖結合為共同體的慾望。然而，政治權威的原則往往使得此愛的結合被丟回到實用生活的層次，並且導向具有道德訓令的壓抑狀態（“Sacrifices,” *Vision of Excess*, 133）。

這個必須出現的「我」，以「命令式之完成與存有之主權」(*the imperative completion and sovereignty of being*)的模式投射出來，並且是以一種意識之外的暴力完成。巴岱伊指出，此拋擲而出的動作，如同英雄式的死亡，攜帶著渴求動物性死亡之絕對愉悅，甚至攜帶著對於此撕裂身體的嫌惡。³因此，巴岱伊指出，自由而神聖的道德使命，背後其實含有對於死亡的固執渴求。人為了自身所處的空無，而迫切的投注於承諾美好願景的對象。對於神的無條件而純粹之愛的渴求，導致道德的絕對命令以及政治權威以同樣模式出現在做為領袖的「人—神」身上。這就是巴岱伊討論法西斯結構的切入點。在他的論述中，我們看到法西斯結構中的領袖所具有的異質性引發強烈的道德認同，這個領袖同時是不能碰觸、不能質問的神聖。巴岱伊想要討論的是人們為何想要進入共同體，與其結合，進入權力層級，為何總會陷入國家論述的宗教神秘狀態。

二、研究計畫的可能性：我們如何透過這些思考，來面對我們的問題呢？

我們是否可以檢視文化論述的內在宗教性、無上命令、非理性、象徵交換、偽裝路徑、神聖與賤斥、犧牲、主權、疆界等現象？

我們是否可以藉由拓撲學方式——主觀感性的想像、理性話語的凝視、抗拒命名

1927-1939, 131)

² *A fortiori* a historical representation of the formation of *me* (considered as a part of everything that is an object of knowledge) and of its imperative or impersonal modes dissipates, and this allows only the subsistence of the violence and the avidity for *the dominion of the me over the void* in which it is suspended; at will, even in its prison, *the me that I am* realizes everything that preceded it or surrounds it, whether it exists as life or as simple being, as a void submitted to its anxious dominion. (“Sacrifices,” *Visions of Exces: Selective Writings*, 1927-1939, 131)

³ “It supposes *the imperative completion and sovereignty of being* at the moment it is projected into the unreal time of death. It supposes at once the exigency and the limitless breakdown of imperative life, the consequence of pure seduction and the heroic form of the *me*; it thus attains the rending subversion of the *god* that dies. The death of the god is produced not as metaphysical alteration (concerning the common denominator of being), but as the absorption of a life *avid for imperative joy in the heavy animality of death. The filthy aspects of the torn-apart body guarantee the totality of disgust where life subsides.*” (“Sacrifices,” *Visions of Exces: Selective Writings*, 1927-1939, 132)

的真實湧發——以動態變化的方式彼此扣連的三環結構，來分析特定時期的台灣文學、藝術、劇場，或是文化政策、道德教育、政治文宣，以及歷史事件。

三、幾個思考的切入點：

道德律或是無上命令的最高點，如何隱藏於文字或是圖像之中？此道德律或是無上命令，如何被各種不同概念置換？要如何分析此最高點立法時所預設的否定與排除？文字與圖像如何呼應此無上命令所貫串的層級與疆界？如何跨越、僭越、摧毀、重劃此疆界？被排除物如何出現在文字與圖像中？如何檢視此「命令式之完成與存有之主權」的投射模式？如何思考此命令式之下所引發的崇敬、迷戀、嫌惡、仇恨、自我貶低、自我厭惡？此命令式的先驗圖像是在何種歷史情境中被完成的？「我」的出現、完成、累積、擴張，是在什麼模式的偽裝掩飾與曲折路徑之下進行的？

傅柯所討論的倫理系譜學，所謂的自我技術 *self-subjectification*，是否可以具體提供我們幾個思考的層次，例如什麼是倫理元素，意向(intention)？或是慾望？或是感情？人們如何被激發起辨識他們道德責任的方式(mode of subjectivation [mode d'assujettissement])，是神聖的命令？或是自然法則？或是康德式的理性規律？人們如何改變自己，以便成為倫理主體？(ethical subjects, self-forming activity, self-fashioning)；什麼樣的道德理想或是目的性(Telos)，例如純正、不朽、自由、自己的主宰等等。這些倫理面向，牽涉了人們的行為、規範，以及自己與自己關係，也牽涉了不同的自我管理技術。

至於巴岱伊所指出的，語言製造自己之外的東西，是否可以提供我們檢視語言內部的悖反痕跡？所謂「之外」的東西，便是依附於此實體的造因、基本原則與目的，或者，換句話說，就是其中所隱藏的「無上命令」。巴岱伊說，就語言而言，沒有任何「失去」。只要說出了，就必然被指涉，無論是以正面或是負面的方式。語言必然含有攻擊性，語言的肯定，必然包含其否定之反面。

巴岱伊說，最高點的失去，是令說話者最為難堪而無法面對的。

The loss, at the apogee (最高點), is what is extremely disconcerting to the speaker, and it is something that only the movement of 'negative theology' has the power to contemplate as an object, if it is true that in that movement the object in question negates itself as an object, that it becomes an object." (*The Accursed Share II*, 316)

巴岱伊所提出的「象徵消費」、二度復返以及事物之秩序，是我們可以參考的路徑，使我們得以探處那無法面對的「失去」。

此外，主權如何被描述、被呈現？有關主權的不同形式，功利性、單一邏輯、單一目的、單一體系的片面主權，相對於無行動、無意識的全面主權，也是重要的觀察點。巴岱伊認為，美的無能與無行動，其實是全面的主權統治。沒有意識的

美承受內在不可分之整體與分裂。相對於此不分之狀態的，是有意識的抽象我、主體、理解之暴力，以死亡的行動帶來生命的消解與歷史的鬥爭。(285)使用「意義」，便是逃避與否認。使用「非—意義」書寫，則肯定了生命的整體。我們在何處看到了主權的片面爭奪？我們又在何處可以看到「意義」書寫與「非—意義」書寫？

("But if I say *non-sense* while searching, on the contrary, for an object free of sense, I deny nothing, I utter the affirmation in which all of life is finally revealed in consciousness." ("On Nietzsche: The Will to Chance," *The Bataille Reader*, 339).

"This beauty without consciousness of itself cannot therefore really – but not for the same reason as life, which 'recoils in horror from death and wants to save itself from annihilation' – bear death and preserve itself in it. **This impotent beauty at least suffers from feeling the break-up of the profoundly indissoluble totality of what is (of the concrete-real).** Beauty would like to remain the sign of an accord of the real with itself. It cannot become conscious negativity, awakened in dismemberment, and the lucid gaze, absorbed in the negative. This latter attitude presupposes the violent and laborious struggle of man against nature and its end. That is the historic struggle where man constitutes himself as 'subject' or as 'abstract I' of the understanding, as a separated and named being." (285)

附錄一：康德的「實踐理性批判」核心概念

Critique of Practical Reason

定義：實踐原則包含在幾個實踐法則之下對於意志的一般性決定。若只屬於一個人所做的判斷，是根據他的個人原則，如同座右銘，則牽涉了主體以及慾望機制。這個受到慾望與目的所導引的法則，只是教條，是**假設性命令(hypothetical imperatives)**，受到了主觀狀態的影響；而康德所討論的「**無上命令**」(**categorical imperative**)或是「**道德律**」，則是客觀的價值，無論我們的慾望與目的何在，我們都必須去執行，是日常實踐行為中的純粹意志之規定根據。“Thou shall” (225-6)

定則 I：所有以物作為慾望對象，並作為意志之決定基礎，無法成為實踐的法則。“All practical principles which presuppose an object (matter) of the faculty of desire as the ground of determination of the will are empirical, and can furnish no practical laws.” 只有純粹理性才是無條件的實踐，受到經驗性侷限的理性則不是。對於現實對象的欲求是經驗性的，此對象的實現就會引發**愉快或是不愉快**的感覺。這樣的法則無法當作實踐的法則。“if the desire for this object *precedes* the practical rule, and is the condition of our making it a principle, then I say (*in the 1st place*) this principle is in that case wholly empirical, for then what determines the choice is **the idea of an object**, and that relation of this idea to the subject by which its faculty of desire is determined to its realization. Such a relation to the subject is called the *pleasure* in the realization of an object.” (Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 227-8)

定則 II：自愛與個人幸福(**self-love and private happiness**)，是人類行為最基本的原則。然而，人的感受性不同，對不同人而言，愉快或是痛苦具有不同的意義，這些感覺都建立於對物體的不同意念。“Pleasure arising from the idea of the existence of a thing, is so far as it is to determine the desire of this thing, is founded on the **susceptibility of the subject**, since it *depends* on the presence of an object; hence it belongs to **sense (feeling)**, and not to understanding, which expresses a relation of the idea *to an object* according to concepts, not to the subject according to feelings. It is then practical only in so far as the faculty of desire is determined by **the sensation of agreeableness** which the subject expects from the actual existence of the object.” (Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 228) 我們無法根據事物的意義來區分較高層次的慾望或是較低層次的慾望。人會在他所重視的不同事物中（表演/賭博/晚餐/演講），選擇可以提供較多而且維持較久快感的對象(how much and how great pleasure they will give for the longest time)。權力運作、克服障礙，也都會帶來快感。(Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 228) 如果沒有純粹形式上的法

則，我們便無法區分較高慾望與較低慾望。我們無法自己提供使自己滿足的途徑。我們都是不足的，都需要別人，我們有所需求、慾望，而這些需求與慾望是與主體對於快樂與痛苦的感受性而決定的。理性以及其實踐法則立即決定意志，也具有立法的效力。此理性不透過愉快或是痛苦的感覺，甚至不透過法則所帶來的快樂。“Reason, with its practical law, determines the will immediately, not by means of an intervening feeling of pleasure or pain, not even of pleasure in the law itself, and it is only because it can, as pure reason, be practical, that it is possible for it to be legislative.” (231) “To be happy is necessarily the wish of every finite rational being, and this, therefore, is inevitably a determining principle of its faculty of desire. For we are not in possession originally of satisfaction with our whole existence—a bliss which would imply a consciousness of our own **independent self-sufficiency**—this is a problem imposed upon us by our own finite nature, because we have wants, and these wants regard the matter of our desires, that is, something that is relative to a subjective feeling of pleasure or pain, which determines what we need in order to be satisfied with our condition.” (Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 232) 正由於這些 **self-love** 無法以一致的方式出現，因此也無法歸納出任何普世性的法則。

定則 III：純粹實踐理性的基本法則：**使你的意志力所驅動的準則同時也是普世性的立法原則。** “Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation.” (Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 238) 也就是說，實踐的法則是「意志是絕對而立即的被客觀決定」(the will is objectively determined absolutely and immediately)。這個基本法則的意識以一種綜合的**先驗模式**強而有力地向我們展現。純粹理性給人們的普世法則，也就是**道德律(moral law)** (“We may call the consciousness of this fundamental law a fact of reason, because we cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason, e.g. the consciousness of freedom (for this is not antecedently given), but **it forces itself on us** as a synthetic *a priori* proposition, which is not based on any intuition, either pure or empirical. It would, indeed, be analytical if the freedom of the will were presupposed, but to presuppose freedom as a positive *concept* would require an intellectual intuition, which cannot here be assumed; however, **when we regard this law as given**, it must be observed, in order not to fall into any misconception that it is not an empirical fact, but the sole fact of the pure reason, **which thereby announces itself as originally legislative** (*sic volo, sic jubeo*). [➔最高律令，與主權邏輯相似，可以一起討論。]

定則 IV：**意志的自主性(autonomy of the will)**是所有道德律的唯一原則，而不能夠是他治(heteronomy)。這個獨立性，也就是反面意義上的自由。道德律所表達的，也就是這個純粹實踐理性的自主性。“this independence is freedom in the

negative sense, and this *self-legislation of the pure, and, therefore, practical reason*, is freedom in the *positive* sense. Thus the moral law expresses nothing else than the *autonomy* of the pure practical reason; (Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 241)不是目的（他人的快樂）決定純粹意志，而是**法的形式**，透過此形式，我限制我的準則，以便賦予具有普世性的法則，並沿用於實踐理性。透過此限制，產生義務的概念，而得以將我的自愛延展到他人的幸福。 “Therefore it was not the object (the happiness of others) that determined the pure will, but it was the form of law only, by which I restricted my maxim, founded on inclination, so as to give it the universality of a law, and thus to adapt it to the practical reason; and it is this restriction alone, and not the addition of an external spring, that can give rise to the notion of the obligation to extend the maxim of my self-love to the happiness of others.” (Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 242)自愛的準則只會建議，而道德律則會命令。（“the maxim of self-love (prudence) only *advises*; the law of morality *commands*.”244)若人無法達到此道德律，便會鄙視自己。至於道德律僭越，懲罰是不會有助於此道德律的維繫。個人需要先完全認同此道德律，接受其賦予的責任、感到自尊、自我滿意，若有違此道德律，則會感到懺悔。這些便是道德感。 “A man must first appreciate the importance of what we call duty, the authority of the moral law, and the immediate dignity which the following of it gives to the person in his own eyes, in order to feel that satisfaction in the consciousness of his conformity to it, and the bitter remorse that accompanies the consciousness of its transgression.” (Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 247)

- 所謂「範疇」，就是純粹知識概念，是形成對象（對象知識）的必要的先天構成條件，同時需要直觀經驗性的材料來充實。在實踐理性批判中，康德指出，純粹實踐理性的概念本身就是它的對象，而無關經驗性的材料。這是十二個善惡觀念的自由範疇（249）

量：主觀（個人的實踐意見）、客觀（原則）、先驗（自由法則）

質：行動的實踐規則、禁制的實踐規則、例外的實踐規則

關係：人格關係、人的條件、相互關係

模式：被允許或是被禁止、責任或是非責任、完美或是非完美責任

- 善惡的概念決定了意志的對象。 It is the notions of good and evil that first determine an object of the will. (Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 250)
- 康德提出了先驗法則的圖式決定了此意志。 “When I subsume under a *pure practical law* an action possible to me in the world of sense, I am not concerned with the possibility of the action as an event in the world of sense. This is a matter that belongs to the decision of reason in its theoretic use according to the law of causality, which is a pure concept of the understanding, for which reason

has a schema in the sensible intuition.” (Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 251)這個圖式與想像程序呼應，以法為形式，以作為判斷的準則。

純粹實踐理性的動機

- 道德律直接決定意志。“What is essential in the moral worth of action is that the moral laws should directly determine the will.” 動機是決定意志的主觀基礎，如此，此動機必須是道德律，同時也是決定行為的原則。(Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 255)
- 有關道德感引發的 pleasure and displeasure,以及有關自愛與自欺：純粹實踐理性會檢查自私之傾向，限制它，以合於法則，此是理性自愛。(256)self-regard
- 此道德感會影響到感受性的問題，感覺，(Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 257)—包括自愛、自滿、愛、畏懼、尊敬、羞辱。
- 康德提出了對於宗教狂熱份子的檢討。實踐理性的道德敬重與出於感性的道德狂熱是有區別的。“The disposition that he ought to have in obeying this is to obey it from duty, not from spontaneous inclination, or from an endeavour taken up from liking and unbidden; and this proper moral condition in which he can always be is virtue, that is, moral disposition militant, and not holiness in the fancied possession of a perfect purity of the disposition of the will. It is nothing but moral fanaticism and exaggerated self-conceit that is infused into the mind by exhortation to action as noble, sublime, and magnanimous, by which men are led into the delusion that it is not duty, that is, respect for the law, whose yoke they must bear, whether they like it or not, that constitutes the determining principle of their actions, and which always humbles them while they obey it.” (Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 267)
- 康德指出，不只浪漫作家或是重情感的教育家，甚至最為嚴格的哲學家，都會將道德狂熱主義帶進來，充滿英雄主義，而不是清醒而智慧的道德紀律。這些道德狂熱主義者會被道德完美主義的夢想所遮蔽。(Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” 268)
- Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that does embrace nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest submission, and yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror, but merely holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind, and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly counter-work it;
- 人是道德律的主體，respect-inspiring idea of personality；to dread the inward glance of self-examination” 為了不要讓自己看低自己.greatest advantage of life 也是在道德行為

附錄二：康德的判斷力批判——美的問題

Critique of Judgment

第一個面向：質的問題 aspect of quality

1. The judgment of taste is aesthetic. 我們對於美的辨識，不是透過知性判斷，而是透過配合知性的想像，以及因此影像而產生的快感或是不悅感(feeling of pleasure or displeasure)。品味的判斷不是知性判斷，也不涉及邏輯，而純粹是主觀的，因此是美學的。每個影像都有其客觀指涉，但是其引發的快感或是不悅感，則不在於客體，而在於主體之感覺。(This denotes nothing in the object, but is a feeling which the subject has by itself and in the manner in which it is affected by the image.) 這個愉悅或是不悅之感，牽涉了主體對於生命的感覺，他將此影像與其整體存在狀態之感受的比較，而與知識之區分與判斷無關。(to compare the given image in the subject with the entire faculty for imagining of which the mind is conscious in the feeling of its state) (Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 293)
2. The delight which determines the judgment of taste is independent of all interest. 我們對於真實存在事物所感受到的愉悅，我們稱之為「關心」(interest)，涉及慾望，然而，有關美的問題，就無關此物是否真實存在，或者我是否可能獲得此物。康德強調，若對此物有任何利益上的關心(interest)，則其美感判斷必然是片面的。因此，純粹的品味判斷必須是完全超然的。(Complete indifference) (Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 294)
3. Delight in the agreeable is coupled with interest. 康德特別區分了 feeling and sensation：感官性 sensation 所引發的快感牽涉了關心、慾望與滿足(agreeable, interest, desire, gratification)；美感則不涉及感官性，而是感覺。(Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 296)
4. Delight in the Good is coupled with interest. 有關「善」(good)的判斷，涉及有關此物之作用的知識，然而，美是立即的愉悅(what pleases immediately)，而不涉及是否是真或是善。“Only by what a man does heedless of enjoyment, in complete freedom and independently of what he can produce passively from the hand of nature, does he give absolute worth to his existence, as the real existence of a person.”
5. Comparison of the three specifically different kinds of delight. 三種截然不同的喜悅之比較：the Agreeable，可欲求者，可滿足人，the beautiful，令人喜悅，the good，人所贊同，被賦予客觀價值者。
6. 有關美的定義：品味是根據不涉及關心與否的喜悅或是厭惡來評斷對象或是再現物的模式。此令人喜悅之物便稱之為美。Taste is the faculty for estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or

aversion apart from any interest. The object of such a delight is called beautiful. (Kant, Critique of Judgment, 300)

第二個面向：量的問題 aspect of quality

7. The beautiful is that which, apart from concepts, is represented as the Object of a UNIVERSAL delight. 美具有普世性，而且是主觀的普世性，而非客觀的普世性。The judgment of taste, with its attendant consciousness of detachment from all interest, must involve a claim to validity for all men, and must do so apart from universality attached to objects; i.e., there must be coupled with it a claim to subjective universality. (Kant, Critique of Judgment, 301)
- Comparison of the beautiful with the agreeable and the good by means of the above characteristic. 每個人對於賞心悅目之事(agreeable to eye or ear)都有不同的品味。不過，美則不是專屬於個人的。(Kant, Critique of Judgment, 302)

第三面向：目的的關係 aspect of the relation of the ends

- Finality in general. 保存持續狀態的，被視為愉悅的，相對的，則為不悅。The consciousness of the causality of imagining the state of the subject as one tending to preserve a continuance of that state, may be said here to denote in a general way what is called pleasure; whereas displeasure is that imagining which contains the ground for converting the state of the images into their opposite.” (Kant, Critique of Judgment, 303)此終止狀態，穩定，不會持續變動不安。
- The sole foundation of the judgment of taste is the FORM OF APPROPRIATENESS of an object (or mode of imagining it.) 品味判斷的唯一基礎是對象合宜的形式。任何品味判斷不能依賴主觀目的為基礎，也不能夠依賴其功用性。我們判斷為美的，是具有形式上的合宜，而且是具有普世性的。(Kant, Critique of Judgment, 304)
- The judgment of taste rests upon a priori grounds. 品味的判斷依賴先驗基礎，正如實踐理性批判中所說明的，尊敬的感觉來自於先驗的普世道德觀念，而與我們實際上接觸對象的愉悅與否無關。美學判斷亦然。當我們面對美的對象沈思時，我們被美捕獲，延續的狀態被增強，而心靈狀態是被動的。(Kant, Critique of Judgment, 305-6)

有關壯美崇高 analytic of the sublime

- Transition from the faculty for estimating the beautiful to that of estimating the sublime. 從優美到壯美的轉移。壯美與優美一樣，都與感官與知識判斷無關。二者皆與想像力與再現有關，都是獨一的品味判斷。自然界中的優美涉及物體的形式，有其限制，而壯美則可出現於無形體的對象，甚至可能呈現無止境的意象，但仍有其整體感(image of limitlessness, yet with a super-added

thought of its totality)。優美是不確定性的知性概念的呈現，而壯美則是不確定理性概念的呈現(the beautiful seems to be regarded as a presentation of an indeterminate intellectual concept, the sublime as a presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason.)。優美帶來的愉悅與質(quality)有關，而壯美帶來的愉悅與量(quantity)有關。優美帶來生命的延續感，以及迷人、遊戲式的想像，而壯美使生命力的被更大力量的釋放而暫時被制止。壯美所帶來的愉悅不僅只是吸引力，而更兼有排斥感，因此壯美快感同時有正面愉悅與負面愉悅。Hence charms are repugnant to it; and, since the mind is not simply attracted by the object but is also alternately repelled thereby, the delight in the sublime does not so much involved positive pleasure as admiration or respect; i.e., merits the name of a negative pleasure.” 更為重要的區別是，以自然界為例，優美之物具有形式上的完滿與和諧，而壯美之物則違背我們的想像力，格格不入，甚至如同暴怒。(contravene the ends of our power of judgment, to be ill-adapted to our faculty for imagining, and to be, as it were, an outrage on the imagination, yet it is judged all the more sublime on that account)僅僅是暴風雨激起的巨浪，不能夠被稱為壯美，而是恐怖。壯美心靈被激發而超出其感受狀態。For the sublime, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns rational ideas, which, although no adequate presentation of them is possible, may be excited and called into the mind by that very inadequacy itself which does not admit of presentation through the senses. The broad ocean agitated by storms cannot be called sublime. Its aspect is horrible, and one must have stored one's mind in advance with a rich stock of ideas, if such an intuition is to raise it to the pitch of a feeling which is itself sublime—**sublime because the mind has been incited to go beyond the senses, and employ itself upon ideas involving higher ends.**” (Kant, Critique of Judgment, 307-8)自給自足的大自然之美(self-subsisting)依存於和諧一致的體系，這個體系有其目的。但是，壯美卻顯得混亂 chaos 狂亂 wild 不規律 irregular。

Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” [1788] *Basic Writings of Kant*, ed. Allen Wood, (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), pp. 225-271

Kant, “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” [1793], *Basic Writings of Kant*, ed. Allen Wood, (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), pp. 275-313

延伸閱讀：Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” [1784] *Basic Writings of Kant*, ed. Allen Wood, (New York: The Modern Library, 2001), 133-142