

## 從海德格到拉岡：話語邏輯與主體的出現

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### 一、世界與話語結構

海德格說，要了解人有構成世界的能力，就須要先了解語言的本質。語言，以及語言的法則，成為問題的關鍵。此法則構成了關係的根本模式，海德格所謂的“as”結構，也是話語之理性判斷、區分、分配以及出現的根本問題。首先，我們會面對的問題是話語背後的邏輯，logic。qua，指向兩種關係：the moment of beings *as such*, and the moment of beings *as a whole*。在整體中的存有者，也就是存有者如何與整體聯繫，建立關係，這是一個時代的形上學。

海德格認為，要回到“as”結構的原初面向，並不是要探究某個根源，而是要以回溯的方式，探究「存有的顯露以及作為整體的存有」(the manifestness of beings and the ‘as a whole’)到底意味著甚麼。要進行此探討，就要從其命題結構(propositional

structure)開始檢視。海德格指出，陳述句通常指向兩重關係：其一是人的行為關係(*comportment*)，例如期望、疑問、命令、要求、發現、確認；其二是涉及此陳述背後所事先設定的規定性法則(301-

302)。但是，正如斯賓諾沙在其《倫理學》所指出，片面的陳述多半是出自主觀的片面位置，而這些片面的主觀位置有其內在的邏輯，甚至是時代性的文法。

不過，海德格指出，詩的語言與命題性陳述不同。

亞里士多德就也曾經指出非規定性的話語模式(*non-thetic discourse*)，而邏輯就無法承擔此非規定性話語的功能

(303)。海德格指出，話語，是人的熱情所在，人透過話語，表現自身。<sup>1</sup>海德格指出，要進行此「在世存有」(*Dasein*)之話語結構的探究，不是要離開此結構，而正是要在此結構中(*through this structure*)，理解為何其具有「特殊性」以及其「誘惑力」(*the peculiar and at the same time seductive character*) (304)。

但是，爲了要了解人與世界的關係，海德格將自己限制在命題式陳述的問題，並且回到了亞里士多德對於 *λόγος* 的定義，來討論 “as-structure,” “as-phenomenon,” “as a whole” 與命題式陳述的問題。<sup>2</sup> 首先，亞里士多德將 *λόγος* 視爲話語，「任何說出的話以及可說的話」(*discourse, everything that is spoken and sayable*)，人是「擁有話語能力的生命」(*the living being that essentially possesses the possibility of discourse*)，而動物是「沒有話語的生命」(*αλόγος*)。他指出，後來拉丁文將此說法翻譯爲「人是理性的動物」(*animal rationale, a living being with*

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<sup>1</sup> (a passion for the logos; for it is in the logos that man expresses what is most essential to him, so as in this very expression to place himself into the clarity, depth, and need pertaining to the essential possibilities of his action, of his existence.” (303)

<sup>2</sup> 海德格提醒我們，他曾經在其他著作中處理過有關 *logos* 的問題，例如 *Being and Time* (§§7B, 33), *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (§§7, 11, and Part III), *On the Essence of Ground* (Section I). 但是，他強調，那些討論只處理了 *logos* 問題在思想史中的部份面向，而並沒有處理此問題的完整面向。

reason)，這種譯法已經失去了原本λόγος意指使某物可以有意義，可以被理解的最初意思：giving-to-be-understood。海德格強調，人與動物都會發出聲音(φωνή, voice)，然而人的φωνή所以會不同於動物的

φωνή，原因是因為人會接合而構成意義。海德格說明，亞里士多德以符號的接合並且使其相符合，來說明話語的意思。

σύμβολο是符號(symbol)的意思，「說出來」，而符號將二物接合(hinge, joint, seam)，並且相符(agreement)。人使其自身與其周遭事物連結(hold together)，而詞語(word)，話語(discourse)，便是使人與物接合並相符(305-308)。

更重要的是，海德格指出，傳統的譯法，例如理性話語中的真偽之辨，無法讓我們理解亞里士多德的意思。話語除了接合聲音，構成意義，其本質更在於其揭露－遮蔽(revealing-concealing)的展現(exhibiting)之可能性。

a discourse is propositional through revealing in concealment, not merely being found in it, but lying in it as underlying it, as contributing toward its ground and its essence. ... to be deceptive is a pointing out, to pretend something, to present something as something it is not, to present something that is not such and such. This deception, this being deceptive that belongs to the essence of the logos—this proffering of something as something it is not—this pretending, with respect to whatever the deception is about, is a concealing. **That logos which has the possibility of being able to conceal is an exhibiting.** We have to say: which has the possibility, because Aristotle emphasizes **revealing in concealment**, either one or the other, but one of the two, the inherent possibility of one or the other, either concealing—or not concealing, but **precisely taking from concealment, thus not concealing but revealing—a-letheia.** (310)

亞里士多德說，命題式的話語是透過遮蔽而揭露，透過指出其所不是者，而發出此命題式的陳述。但是，這也意味著必有揭露，必有真理的顯現：指出的同時，已經透露了其位置

與根基(ground)，因為這個根基是構成as-structure的規則。非命題式的apophantic話語，透過否定而指出某物的話語(An allusion to something by denying that it will be mentioned)，也有其揭露而展現的效果。關鍵在於語言的悖反：任何相反的性質都在可能性之中，這是透過領悟(apprehending)而朝向統一(unity)的本質。若指出某物，已經預設了遮蔽，或是指出而帶出了顯現，都因為有個統一狀態的條件。

因此，海德格說，問題關鍵便在於as structure事先作為話語真偽之可能性的條件。<sup>3</sup>這個as的結構並不內在於話語之中，並不是話語之屬性，而是「話語之可能性的條件」本身。所謂“as a whole”，便指出了此關連性的整體。無論是指向或是遠離，無論是分離或是合併，都在此統一的整體中。此處，關於話語的雙重性，也就是說，每一種命題式的陳述都既是指向，也是遠離(apophanis)，讓我們對於所謂真偽的判定有不同的理解。亞里士多德說，對於真偽的判定，是基於某種關係的建立。因此，命題式陳述，指出某物，是將某物帶入視野，將某些現成之物帶入視野。(319-320)

It is a bringing into view of what is at hand in the way in which it is at hand. The being at hand of whatever is at hand, however, is grasped as the presence of something, and ever since antiquity the presence of something has been regarded as the proper meaning of what we designate as being. (320)

然而，所有的指向，都指向了時間中此刻「所是」之物，所謂的存有物being。命題式的陳述是指向存有物的在場。然而，事物的狀態若以「是」(is)表達，則是附加上了意義，是連結與綜合的統一，是以述詞的方式建立關係。(324-326)因此，「是」這個聯繫詞是限定性的指向，此聯繫詞連結了述詞的關係。

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<sup>3</sup> the prior apprehending of something as something in forming a unity, is the condition of the possibility of truth and falsity of the logos. (314-315)

不過，海德格強調，雖然亞里士多德關於「是」這個繫辭的討論建立了後續關於邏輯的傳統，可是，這個「是」的重新詮釋，卻打開了不同的空間。這個「是」本身是否具有悖反性？這個「是」可以打開多向度的面向嗎？這牽涉了話語作為整體結構的可能性之基礎。<sup>4</sup>海德格因此回到了話語原初的顯露與遮蔽，既肯認也否認的本質。他指出，我們無法從正面真實的判斷 (positive true judgment) 來掌握事物，就連亞里士多德都無法指出正確的途徑。亞里士多德的限制在於他仍舊要掌握話語可見的結構。海德格坦承他自己在 *Being and Time* 對於logos的詮釋，也陷入了這個侷限。他在此處的詮釋，則根本地逸離了那一條取徑。他指出，話語最內部的本質(the innermost essence)就在於其「既是肯定也是否定」(both positive and negative) 的可能性，而這正可以將我們帶回話語的起源(origin) (337)。海德格指出，判斷與肯定的話語是人建立關係的能力，但是，這種話語正好將我們帶到一個既熟悉又陌生(uncanniness)的場域，我們的最根本的深刻漠然(profound boredom)。然而，繫辭的多義性(polysemy)卻向我們顯示，這個as-structure的共同根基本身，便具有此既是肯定亦是否認的本質。

海德格從語言的根基處，開始討論話語邏輯前(pre-logical)之開放性。命題式的陳述僅只是將顯現出來的事物分離出來，而話語在肯認的同時，真實與虛假同時被「表達」(expressed)，被溝通(communicated)。海德格指出，這會使我們獲得對於「真相」(truth)的本質更為深刻的認識；也就是說，在predicate之前就顯露的真相，可以在話語中被全面的表達。回到話語的肯認之前，在語言之前，也就是肯認與繫辭被說出的起點，我們會看到真相的場所(the place of truth)，海德格此處說，這就是解構(destructuring)的必要性。如此，我們才可能回到所有能力之可能性的原初根基(originary ground) (341)。

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<sup>4</sup> “the ground of the possibility of logos as such taken as a whole, and are doing so via the guiding thread of the “is” and its place in the logos-structure as a whole.” (334)

海德格問了一個很有意思的問題：如果語言前存有狀態的顯露，比話語還要原初，如果話語是人類關係(*comportment*)的方式，那麼，這個原初顯露的位置在何處？

<sup>5</sup>海德格說，這是在述語之前的狀態，朝向連結而開放。此外，這個開放狀態已經是一個存有狀態的發生(*a rich, intrinsically articulated structural context which evidently characterizes a fundamental occurrence in the Dasein of man*)，一個可以在三種時間中發生的狀態：記錄的發生的此刻，可完成的狀態，以及存有狀態的解蔽。(348)海德格說，靠著邏輯、理性、精神，都無法讓我們回到此根基狀態的理解。只有當我們將立即現存的在世存有(*Dasein*)打開，將連結世界(*binding*)的性質顯露，才能讓*Da-sein*出現。海德格強調，如果我們要從被理性與邏輯控制的形上學解開的話，並不意味著離開此話語結構，反而正是要從此處揭露其結構。

We have seen that logos, ratio, reason, is what has dominated the entire problematic of metaphysics precisely with respect to the problem of world which failed to come to light. If we wish to free ourselves from this tradition in one respect, then this does not mean somehow pushing it aside and leaving it behind us. Rather all liberation from something is genuine only when it masters and appropriates whatever it is liberating itself from. (352)

而唯一的解放的辦法，就是此在世存有本身的轉變。

海德格指出，只有從*ontological difference*出發，才能夠理解存有*onto*的話語模式(*logos*)，才能夠理解此多樣性存有的獨特差異。(360)回到人類將自身連結到對象的問題，此處，海德格所討論的連結，正如同佛洛伊德所討論的挹注(*cathect*)，連結的對象說明了主體的位置，也說明了此作為整體的世界模式。

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<sup>5</sup> If this original manifestness of beings is more originary than the logos, and logos is a manner of human comportment, where then is this originary manifestness? ...Where is this manifestness situated, and what does it consist in? (341)

**Holding oneself toward something binding. The binding character of things always prevails throughout our comportment,** to the extent that we comport ourselves toward beings and in such comportment also—not subsequently and by the way—**comform to beings, without any compulsion, yet nonetheless binding ourselves, but also unbinding ourselves and failing to conform.** ... For not all “standing opposite” necessarily entails binding, and **when we speak of something standing “opposite” as an ob-ject (the subject-object relation, consciousness),** then the decisive problem has been preempted ... **However things stand in this respect, a binding character prevails throughout all being related to ..., all comportment toward beings. We cannot explain this binding character in terms of objectivity, but vice-versa.** (361)

客觀性無法說明此連結的本質，而要以主觀性來解釋。因此，海德格以「投射」，projection，來說明構成世界的根本結構：從自身投出，遠離自身。這個投出，構成了各種可能性，各種連結，開啓了世界的可能性，同時也開啓了存有的獨特差異性。(363-364)

Projecting as this revealing that pertains to making-possible is the proper occurrence of that distinction between being and beings. **The projection is the irruption into this “between” of the distinction. ... the projection unveils the being of beings.** (364)

這個差異，這個存有與存有的中間，這個Da-sein，是離開自己而出現：

It is a being of a properly primordial kind, which has irrupted to the way of being which we call Da-sein, and to that being which we say exists, i.e., ex-sists, is an exiting from itself in the essence of its being, yet without abandoning itself. (365)

**In projecting, the Da-sein in him constantly throws him into possibilities and thereby keeps him subjected to what is actual. Thus thrown in this throw, man is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence. Man is history, or better, history is man. Man is enraptured in this transition and therefore essentially “absent.” Absent in a fundamental sense—never simply at hand, but absent in his essence, in his essentially being away, removed into essential having been and future—essentially absencing and never at hand, yet existent in his essential absence. Transposed into the possible, he must constantly be mistaken concerning what is actual. And only because he is thus mistaken and transposed can he become seized by terror. And only where there is the perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the bliss of astonishment—being torn away in that wakeful manner that is the breath of all philosophizing,... (366)**

海德格在全書結尾指出，由於人的投射，進入世界，成為歷史，這正是問題之所在。只有在《世界圖像的時代》，海德格才清晰地檢視此促使人進入的座架之問題。而他在晚期處理詩的語言時，也才能夠指出如何能夠透過思想而靠近此問題之核心。

## 二、話語

海德格在〈哲學的終結與思的任務〉(1964)中說我們應該要「面對事情本身，讓現象向我們顯示」。思考，不是以「光源」照亮事情，而是讓事物閃亮、敞開、解蔽，而重新看見（〈哲學的終結與思的任務〉

《海德格爾選集》1253）。如何能夠讓存在著的某物敞開而顯現自身呢？如何不是被時代的主體座架之呼聲所召喚而顯現自身？海德格指出，要透過「思」來貼近。這個「思」，不是根據某一種先行的理論，不是快速的技術性推進，不是透過以匱乏為基礎的強力意志



的占有欲與權力欲的介入，而是要讓我們緩慢地進入「物」之中，inter-esse，進入其狀態。<sup>6</sup>

「物」(das Ding)是個重要的問題。我們的經驗，或是我們的遭遇，我們觸碰某個超出我們理解的處境、touché，<sup>7</sup>我們被觸碰，某個事件發生，ereignis (event, happening)，經驗的湧發，內部的變化，能夠以外部的某「物」說明嗎？若此「物」僅是個被語言界線所設定的實證之物，例如一座橋，一個水瓶，這座橋或是水瓶本身的物質性命名並無法說明我們的遭遇所引發的變化。海德格已經充分說明了此問題——「橋」所攜帶的四重面向，或是水瓶之「空」所匯聚的世界，使得「物」的在場，是所有不在場者得以匯聚而川流的憑藉。<sup>8</sup>以語言所指稱的「物」，僅只是遮蔽的屏障，在此屏障之下，時間的過去、現在與未來、空間的臨近與遙遠、有限而獨一的人、與無法言說的精神情感狀態，都以極端遙遠卻又極端靠近的方式出現。<sup>9</sup>

命名界線所切斷的實證經驗框架，無法讓我們探觸詞語所展延的相近性與川流的外部，或是經驗無法言說的內部。我們要如何討論此極端遙遠又非常靠近的世界呢？

以海德格的說法，語言本身便是深淵，

是沒有基礎的深淵，abgrund，是基礎的消失，基礎的缺失。但是，這個沒有基礎之處，卻是多重世界匯聚之所。詞語成為此匯聚之所，或是展演區分(distinction)的位置(Ort)。在詞語中，被分開又被拉近的裂隙，海德格稱之為der

Riss，既分離，又引向自身，如同剖面圖(aufriss)與設計圖(vorriss)，標示出在分離(schied)中分開的東西。在此痛苦撕裂之處，兩者所橫貫的「中間」，mitte，以分離又靠近的親密性(innigkeit, intimate)暴露自身（〈走向語言之途〉《走向語言之途》（時報）中譯219-

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<sup>6</sup> 可參考海德格〈尼采的話「上帝死了」〉(1943)，〈什麼召喚思〉(1952)

<sup>7</sup> 如同拉岡所言，可參考“Touché and Automaton,” *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, pp. 53-56.

<sup>8</sup> 可參考海德格在〈物〉(1950)與〈築居思〉(1951)兩篇文章的討論。

<sup>9</sup> 所謂天、地、人、神的四重空間。

225)。語言的剖面，揭露與隱藏，揭露，是顯示，而棄絕隱藏，則是放棄所擁有的關連。

海德格說明棄絕與陳述的不同：

陳述，statement，其字根dicere，是使其顯露，揭露，顯示(zeigen)，與指責(zeihen)，責令(zichten)都是同一個詞；棄絕，renouncement，則從動詞寬宥(verzeihen)衍生。放棄擁有，放棄宣稱。To give up the claim to something, to deny oneself something (“Word,”

141；〈詞語〉《走向語言之途》（時報）中譯190-

194)是，也不是；棄絕，而悲傷，承認失去的對象，處於哀悼之中mourning。棄絕，不是拒絕「說」，棄絕仍然維持與詞語的關係，只是換了一種說的方式，a different melos, a different tone。<sup>10</sup>因此，海德格說，「語言說」，Die Sprache

spricht。語言召喚入近處，Nähe。召喚不是奪取被召喚者，而是讓被召喚者保持在遠處，往返不息。語言邀請聆聽者聆聽沉默之處的說話，詞語破碎之處的某物，不是被命名限定的有限之物，而是匯聚而不斷湧發的遙遠。詞語破碎，棄絕過去與語言的關係，某物存在（〈語言的本質〉(1957/58)，《海德格爾選集》

1071) 海德格所說的「物」連結不同的位置，扣連不同空間與不同時間點的脈絡，讓我們透過相互轉換位置，而靠近「物」。所以，他說，「物」就是匯聚、言談、交涉、專心、相關與討論的狀態（〈物〉《海德格爾選集》1174-75）。

這個不在場而遙遠的親近與不斷湧發，這個棄絕之處的發生，是與不是，這個詞語破碎處閃現的某物，要如何才能夠捕捉與理解呢？詞語的內部撕裂，分離又引向自身，既遙遠又

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
<sup>10</sup> “As self-denial, renunciation remains Saying. It thus preserves the relation to the word. But because the word is shown in a different, higher rule, the relation to the word must also undergo a transformation. Saying attains to a different articulation, a different melos, a different tone. The poem itself, which tells of renunciation, bears witness to the fact that the poet’s renunciation is experienced in this sense—by singing of renunciation.” (147；〈詞語〉《走向語言之途》（時報）中譯197)

親近，既棄絕又湧發，不在場者透過詞語而匯聚流通，陌生的他者在黑暗與沉默處閃現——這些海德格式的語言觀，展現了佛洛伊德所說的，原初壓抑與語言如同症狀的替代形成，也靠近了拉岡所不斷試圖靠近的語言的問題。

### 三、拉岡的話語與文字

#### A 話語與無意識替代

佛洛伊德在〈無意識〉一文的結尾處(“Unconscious,” *SE*, XIV, 201-204)，對於語言與無意識的關連，有十分清楚的討論。他先提出的問題是，為什麼表現在語言或是行為的替代形成與症狀會顯得這麼矛盾？他認為，這是因為原初的「物投注」(object-cathexes)已經被放棄，只保留了替代的「物的詞語代表」(word-presentations of objects)。於是，意識所呈現的代表意念分別由「詞語代表」與「事物代表」構成。「事物代表」是由記憶影像所構成，或者是由來自遙遠的記憶痕跡所構成。於是，不是不同的經驗註記，而是同一經驗的不同代表。從佛洛伊德所提供的圖表顯示，「詞語代表」是個相對來說較為封閉系統，而事物代表的「對象聯想」則是開放系統。「詞語代表」包含了聲音影像，動作影像，書寫影像，閱讀影像；對象聯想則包含音響、觸覺、視覺以及其他無法具體羅列的面向——只有詞語代表的聲音影像與對象聯想連結。(SE, XIV, 214)



物——>記憶痕跡——>意象(201)。精神分裂者放棄物投注，而以「字投注」取代。物的再現透過投注而發生，或是記憶意象的投注。無法以語言表達的，未被高度投注的，則留在無意識系統中(SE, XIV, 202)。透過字，甚至只有關係之再現(SE, XIV, 202)。佛洛伊德告訴我們，意念一則以某種聯想的方式與被拒絕的意念相連結，一則卻又因與此被拒絕的意念的遙遠關係而逃離壓抑。無意識保留了原初對象的「物投注」，這是最初的對象，而前意識則過渡投注到「詞語代表」。由於思想過程本身沒有任何特質，也沒有意識，只有透過與感官經驗殘餘物的字的連結，才得以成為意識。

問題是，為什麼「物的代表」不能藉由他們自己的知覺殘餘呈現自己？原因是思考過程與經驗本身的距離已經十分遙遠，以致於思考無法保留知覺之殘餘。但若要成為意識，則需要增加新的特質。此外，與字連結投注，而被賦予的事物代表之間的關係的特性，這關係與知覺雖然毫無關連，但卻構成了思想過程的主要部分。字的投注不屬於壓抑，而是試圖重建對象，朝向治療。因此，透過語言，捕捉失去的對象，是透過語言的口語部分， the verbal part of it，來接近此失落的對象，但是，最終卻只能夠滿足於此詞語，而非此物the thing。

拉岡要重回佛洛伊德，而將話語的結構帶入無意識的概念。拉岡說，海德格所談論的語言中過去曾經存在卻又不存在的曖昧性，正如同歇斯底里之語言，既不是真實也不是

虛假，既在此又不在此；精神分析所要展現的回憶，不是有關現實(reality)的問題，而是**有關真理／真相(truth)的問題**：回憶的語言是主體透過主觀地回憶重組所有的事件，以便重組自己。因此，主體透過朝向他者的語言，而構成他承受自身的歷史的語言（“The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” *Écrits* 48, 拉岡選集，266）。**真理便在真實之中出現**(the emergence of truth in the real)。在這種對話中，主體以互為主體的方式出現。（“The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” *Écrits* 49, 拉岡選集，267）<sup>11</sup>

拉岡強調，佛洛伊德指出夢有句子的結構，書寫的形式。因此，拉岡說，夢的語言如同症狀的語言，透過隱蔽、迴避、扭曲，透過語言背後「飄忽不定的存有」(evanescent being)、「不在場者所構成的在場」("a presence made of absence")，舊版*Écrits* 65)，如同「間隔話語的堵塞物」(the gag that hinges on speech, *Écrits* 58)——這些語言的裂隙，同時阻斷也揭露，而指向被壓抑、不存在但是過去曾經經歷過的痕跡。此處，語言必然呈現內在的雙重性，過去已死去的衝突與現在的衝突並存。（*Écrits* 59, 拉岡選集，279）<sup>12</sup>

拉岡因此要討論語言的象徵作用以及內在的禮物交換，象徵交換。拉岡強調，複雜的關係形式中，存在著最原初的基本形式。只有在不在場的(absence)語言，才能夠帶出在場(prese

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<sup>11</sup> I shall take this opportunity of stressing that the allocation of the subject entails an allocutor – in other words, that the locutor is constituted in it as intersubjectivity.” **無意識所透露的真理**不在實證的語言之中，而刻寫在他方（elsewhere）：在我的身體中有一個紀念碑式的恆常結構，也就是精神官能症歇斯底里的內核；此處，歇斯底里的徵狀透露了一個語言的結構，一旦寫下，便不會被抹除的語言；在檔案資料中，也就是我難以穿透的童年記憶；在語意變化中，就是我所獨有的文字與語彙的貯存區；在傳統與傳說中，甚至會美化了我的歷史；最後，在已經被扭曲竄改的痕跡中。（“The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” *Écrits* 50, 拉岡選集，269）

<sup>12</sup> ”Through that which becomes embodied only by being the trace of a nothingness and whose support cannot thereafter be impaired, the concept, saving the during of what passes by, engenders the thing... For it is still not enough to say that the concept is the thing itself, as any child can demonstrate against the pedant. It is the world of words that creates the world of things – the things originally confused in the hic et nunc of the all in the process of coming-into-being – by giving its concrete being to their essence, and its ubiquity to what has always been.” (*Écrits* 65, 拉岡選集，279)

nce)(“The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,”

287)。理解詞語與物的關係，也牽涉了對於歷史的理解。拉岡強調，歷史唯物論無法解釋主體的歷史。歷史的主觀性，牽涉了不同的回憶與不同歷史的痕跡。對於拉岡而言，我們要教導主體認知他的無意識，其實正是他的歷史；也就是說，我們要協助主體將他所承受的歷史事實，以及所有重要的轉折點，重新組合。這些歷史事實，是早已被查禁而決定了其現有的秩序的隱藏事物。(“The Function and Field of Speech and Language in

Psychoanalysis,” *Écrits* 52, 拉岡選集，270-

271)<sup>13</sup>作為不可共同之共同體之一，或許，我們也需要不斷回過頭來理解我們所承受的歷史事實。

## B 語言之法

拉岡說明，人類的符號化過程(Symbolic processes)便是語言的功能，語言是我們了解人類世界透過詞語組織「物」的起點。

此「物」只能夠透過「詞語」而被表達。德文的Das

Wort，詞語，word，在法文中既是「字」(le mot, word)，又是「話語」(la parole, the speech)。拉岡強調，「字」可能是沉默的，卻同樣會大聲哭喊。(Seminar VII 55)

表象*Vorstellungen*——快樂原則以及失落之物的再次尋獲／連結／闢路／繞道。

拉岡指出，*Vorstellung*牽涉了我們的內在自我對話，因此也牽涉了話語的模式，a discourse。這些表象具有重力吸引，會彼此進行交換，其所根據的是我們所遵循的法則，表義鍊的法則。“these *Vorstellung* gravitate, operate exchanges and are modulated according to laws that you will recognize, ..... as the fundamental laws of the signifying chain.” (Seminar VII 62)那個難以命名的「物」(Das

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<sup>13</sup> What we teach the subject to recognize as his unconscious is his history – that is to say, we help him to perfect the present historization of the facts that have already determined a certain number of the historical ‘turing-points’ in his existence. But if they have played this role, it is already as facts of history, that is to say, in so far as they have been recognized in one particular sense or censored in a certain order.

Ding)決定了限制與禁忌之「法」(makes the law)，也決定了不可碰觸的「壞對象」(the bad object)。主體完全不去接觸此「壞對象」，他已經與「好對象」維持了一定的距離。他其實無法承受「彼物」可能會帶給他的極度的「好」。<sup>14</sup>

爲了維持此距離，主體以各種方式表達，發作、呻吟、詛咒，卻無法理解此「物」。這些症狀，其實在底層是一種防衛機制。拉岡說，這是生理性的防衛(organic defense)，就如同螃蟹爲了保護自己，而主動傷害自己，放棄自己的蟹爪。人會如何進行此防衛機制呢？通常人不會像動物一般自斷手腳，不過，人會在無意識層次的表義結構活動中，進行此防衛機制與自我斷傷(self-mutilation)。此外，人的防衛機制還包括了撒謊，有關罪惡evil的謊言。而這個謊言，卻說出了有關事情的真相。謊言就是無意識的正確的話語ορθός λόγος (correct logos)。因此，在無意識的層次，謊言正是說出真理的方式之一。歇斯底里的例子而言，謊言就是無意識的正確的話語ορθός λόγος (correct logos) correct discourse。(Seminar VII 73)因爲，無意識的謊言說出了自我所無法面對而迴避的真相。

拉岡指出，真相總是以遮蔽的型態出現的。“the path of truth is suggested in a masked form, in the deceiving *Vorstellung* of her clothes. (Seminar VII 74)以歇斯底里案例中愛瑪的例子來看，她的衣服就是她要迴避的卻會引發她危險的興奮的「壞對象」，那個她所不理解的「彼物」das Ding。透過癥狀，或是透過謊言，我們看到了主體所說的真相。倫理原則在意識中以規範出現，或是在前意識中以沈默的方式出現時，是靠近佛洛伊德所說的現實原則。不過，現實原則與快樂原則，其實是以辯證關係相互對應的。

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<sup>14</sup> “Although it must be said that at this level *das Ding* is not distinguished as bad. The subject makes no approach at all to the bad object, since he is already maintaining his distance in relation to the good object. He cannot stand the extreme good that *das Ding* may bring him, which is all the more reason why he cannot locate himself in relation to the bad.” (Seminar VII 73)

拉岡說：真相只能夠說一半。“Truth can only ever be said by halves.” (Seminar XVII, p. 20)

以主人話語為例，此主導地位被 $S_1$ 所佔據。如果我們以法 $law$ 來稱呼此 $S_1$ ，此法作為主導位置，我們就會了解所謂的構成 $the\ right$ 權利〔正義〕 $le\ droit$ 的法 $cette\ loi$ 的問題， $this\ law\ [cette\ loi]\ that\ constitutes\ law\ [le\ droit]$ 。也就是說，所有的權利正義之依據也來自此法。但是，此法與正義 $justice$ 並非同義詞，更準確的說法是，此法之權威性源自於此正義，因此也構成了其曖昧與陷阱。結構本身已經銘刻了此法。<sup>15</sup>這個說出一半的真相，靠近了海德格所探討的指向與遮蔽的問題。然而，說出一半的真相，卻會在不同的位置被說出，有宣稱自己全知的主人位置，也有透過身體語言而說出的歇斯底里話語模式。

拉岡利用海德格所說的最初的說話位置，來說明主體的說話位置。但是，他將這個位置複雜化。他指出，話語中的說話者已經被決定為是一個對象，這是一個無法命名的對象，是促成欲望的原因( $the\ cause\ of\ desire$ )，還未出現而要出現( $want-to-be$ )。<sup>16</sup>他說，他不是討論個別的存在者， $beings$ ，而是談存有本身， $etre$ 。但是，這不是

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<sup>15</sup> Take the dominant in the discourse of the master, whose place is occupied by  $S_1$ . If we called it the *law* we would be doing something that has great subjective value and that would not fail to open the door to a number of interesting observations. It is certain for example that the law--I mean the law as articulated, that very law within whose walls we are finding shelter, this law [*cette loi*] that constitutes law [*le droit*]*—must certainly not be taken as a homonym for what may be spoken of elsewhere under the heading of justice. On the contrary, the ambiguity, the trappings, that this law adopts by virtue of the fact that it derives its authority from justice—this is very precisely a point on which our discourse can perhaps give a better sense of where its real resources are, I mean those that make the ambiguity possible and bring it about that the law remains something that is, first and foremost, inscribed in the structure.* (Seminar XVII, p. 26)

<sup>16</sup> “The speaking being of a discourse finds itself determined as an object.” unnameable object



安定不變的存在，而是從一個開始的位置，an initial position of being，而啓動的辯證。這個開始的機制，the initial effect of the setting。這個起點，是一個分裂(division)的位置，是一個被剝奪了「女人」的位置，因此是被閹割的位置。<sup>17</sup>顯然拉岡要回應的是海德格所問的「人是什麼？」的問題，這個問題其實是：「男人是什麼？」的問題。「男人」被建立為與世界發生關係的主體，「女人」是不存在的，「男人」被剝奪了這個不存在的狀態。

拉岡說，所謂的「我是」的「一」，是「我思」+「我是」。然而此處的「我是」，又是由「我思」+「我是」所構成。「我思」是欲望主體，是情感(affect)所引發的效果。

“the unifying One, the whole One—is not what is involved in identification. The pivotal identification, the major identification, is the unary trait, it is the Being that is marked one.”

“Prior to any promotion of any being, by virtue of a singular one, of what bears the mark from this moment forward, the effect of language arises, as does the first affect.” (Seminar XVII, Fr. 180)

最初的「我是」的位置，引發了「我思考」(it is as a function of this initial position of the “I am” that the “I am thinking” can be even so much as written.) (Seminar XVII, Fr. 180)這個「我」，是個欲望的對象，是a—a既是單一記號，unary trait，作為「我」的記號，the mark of the one，又是objet a，既是原因，又是效果。然而，這個出現的單一表記，這個作為思考與說話的最初的位置，有其不斷重複的功能，拉岡所說的「單一表記的功能」，the function of the unary trait。

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<sup>17</sup> Being deprived of woman—this, expressed in terms of the failure of discourse, is what castration means. (Seminar XVII, Fr. 180)

The signifier becomes articulated, therefore, by representing a subject for another signifier. This is our starting point for giving meaning to this inaugural repetition that is repetition directed at enjoyment.” (Seminar XVII, p. 30)

I am speaking of the mark on the skin, which in this fantasy inspires this nothing but a subject identifying itself as being the object of enjoyment. In the erotic practice I am alluding to, which, to give it its name in case anyone is hard of hearing, is flagellation, the enjoying [le jouir] adopts the very ambiguity by which it is at its level and at no other than the equivalence between the gesture of making a mark and the body, this object of enjoyment, can be touched. (Seminar XVII, p. 31)

單一表記，是主體出現時的身體標記，已經是分裂，透過在自身劃上標記，造成分裂，而出現。拉岡也說，其實這個表記也是享樂的標記：

主體在身上以鞭打(flagellation)而劃上標記，也同時獲得了享樂。誰的享樂？當然是大他者的享樂，大他者藉此而進入主體的世界。但是，也是透過身體被劃上標記的享樂，主體才脫離自戀，而與外界對象發生關係。(Seminar XVII, p. 31)

所謂的大他者，便是話語的場域(the locus of speech)。但是，為何是話語的享樂？拉岡討論了符號呈現 (symbolic demonstration)的話語內在邏輯。話語遵循其內在法則，所謂的陽性原則與陰性原則的分化。

Solely by means of the play of a truth that is not abstract but purely logical, solely by the play of a strict combinatory that is subject only to the requirement that rules, **under the name of axioms, must always be given ... the mute polarization, the imagined ideal unification of that which is knowledge, where one can always find ... the flection, the image ... of two principles, the male principle and the female principle.** (Seminar XVII, Fr. 186)

話語向我們揭露真相。然而，真相不在形式、內容、物質，而在促使說話主體如此出現的原因：此「非一物」，「非一質」的東西（the in-substance, as the a-thing)。這個原因，或是理由，是話語的效果造成的欲望，是小他者的陰性效果，使他欲求此 $a$ ——這個主體說話的第一個位置。主體引此從屬於這個位置，而成為主體。

“the affect that this discourse effect subjects him to—that is, insofar as he receives this feminizing effect of the small  $a$ —that he recognizes what makes him, namely the cause of his desire.” (Seminar XVII, Fr. 186)

因此，拉岡提醒我們，不只是「感受」(perceive)，而是「促使感受」(operceive)，如同作用中的感受，operative, operational, (Seminar XVII, Fr. 187) 我們在此感受性的作用中，成為主體，我們最初是以一個被欲望的對象，一個「我」的最初形式，這個 $a$ 所決定，I am one。我因此出現，顯露自身的真理。

I was speaking before of these spheres with which the extension of science—which, curiously, is found to be very effective at determining what a being is—encircles the earth, a series of zones that science describes as being what it finds. Why not also take account of the place in which these fabrications of science are located, if they re nothing more than the effect of a formalized truth? What are we going to call this place?” (Seminar XVII, Fr. 187)

我的出現，並不是孤立的，因為我與世界連結。我與世界一起出現。所謂的真理，或是我們的真理，我們的敞開的場所，our sphere, 拉岡用 noosphere, alethosphere來代稱：

“The alethosphere—it sounds good. That’s because we suppose that what I called formalized truth already has, sufficiently, the status of truth at the level at which it

operates, at which it operates. But at the level of the operated-on, of what moves around, the truth is not at all unveiled.” (Seminar XVII, Fr. 188)

這個

alethosphere，是拉岡用來來代替海德格所說的Dasein的敞開之域：我們將如此出現的場所，我們依照真理已經被操作而制定的模式，進入此場域。

**“Ousia is not the Other, it’s not a being, it’s between the two. It is not altogether Being either, but, ultimately, it’s pretty close. ... As far as the feminine un-substance is concerned, I would go as far as ‘Parousia.’”** (Seminar XVII, Fr. 188)

拉岡除了以

lathouses來代替aletheia，他還取ousia之意，強調其發生與來臨之意。他說，在任何角落，窗後，街頭轉角，都會有此a出現，如同再次降臨。

“It is clear that it is completely impossible to hold the position as the lathouse. However, it is not all that is impossible, there are many other things as well, provided one gives the word ‘impossible’ a strict meaning—that is to say, provided one determines them only at the level of our formalized truth—namely, that in every formalized field of truth there are truths that one can never demonstrate.” (Seminar XVII, Fr. 190)

拉岡強調，

如果我們賦予impossible嚴格的定義，那麼，在任何真理的形式化場域，總有無法被呈現的真理會出現。這個不可能的場域，就是拉岡所定義的真實，不可能中的可能性。**“It’s at the level of the impossible, as you know, that I define what is real.”**( Seminar XVII, Fr. 190)




## D 話語的不可能與無能力

拉岡以主體出現為例，他說，被橫槓劃上一道線的主體(**S**)，就如同被馴服的家犬，要獲得關於這隻動物的知識，就要透過牠的叫聲。拉岡說，**S<sub>1</sub>**就是這隻動物的叫聲。然而，這個知識，只有在語言中才可以被得知，而且要在最靠近這個**S<sub>1</sub>**的表記的一塊腐肉carrion。(the domestic animal is merely implicated in the language of a primitive knowledge, and that it does not have one. It is, obviously, only open to it to pick over what it has been given that comes closest to the signifier **S<sub>1</sub>**—that is, carrion.” (Seminar XVII, Fr. 194)

如果這隻動物沒有被餵飽，牠就會透過這個表記，這個吠叫聲，來表示自己的欲望。拉岡說，言說正好就是扮演這個腐肉的角色，言說（吠叫）既是要，也同時涉入了其所要的腐肉。**speech can very easily play the role of carrion .”** (Seminar XVII, Fr. 195)

爲甚麼是腐肉？這個表記，既是叫聲，又是死亡的標記，卻又透露出欲望，或是要出現的某物。拉岡說，言說便是執行此符號性功能(symbolic value)，但是，其話語模式(discourse)卻被忽略。(the deployment of speech, which has no other symbolic value, has been confused with what discourse is. As a result, it is never just in any old way or at just any old time the speech functions as carrion.) (Seminar XVII, Fr. 195)

拉岡以主人話語模式(the discourse of the master)以及大學話語為例



Les **places** sont celles de :

l'agent                      l'autre  
la vérité                      la production

Les **termes** sont :

$S_1$ , le signifiant autre  
 $S_2$ , le savoir  
 $s_1$ , le sujet  
 $a$ , le plus-de-jouir

拉岡將話語模式比喻為一套機制(apparatus)，正如他曾經說過，主體便是一套機制，所謂的agent，並不是行動者，而是被促使行動者(the agent is not at all necessarily someone who does but someone who is caused to act) (Seminar XVII, Fr.

197)。拉岡說，正如黑格爾在《精神現象學》中所分析的一個自我意識與另一個自我意識的主奴辯證。主人的話語所揭露的，是居於agent的主體表記

S<sub>1</sub>，是思想，是主體的意識辨證的最高點(zenith)，而已經與死亡同一。<sup>18</sup>也就是說，透過這個表記，如同腐肉，既是言說中死亡的標記，亦是欲望的吠叫聲。而這個主人（自我意識／我是）所說出的真相，亦即是與真實的關係，是「不／可能」。“The truth of what he articulates is this—the relationship to this real insofar as it is, properly speaking, impossible.”  
(Seminar XVII, Fr. 198)

拉岡指出，黑格爾的精神現象學，傳統哲學所謂的哲學思想中的產物，其實是奴隸為主人工作所製造出的真理。<sup>19</sup>

拉岡補充了黑格爾的二項辯證關係，而利用四項關係，來說明這個話語結構。在這套機制中，S<sub>1</sub>是作為「我是」的第一表記，他是被已經被隔離的主體(S)所支撐。S<sub>2</sub>是奴隸，或者可以說是jouissance，因為S<sub>2</sub>工作，他的工作所產出的a，是主人所不知道的真相。拉岡指出，黑格爾所說的理性的狡猾，the cunning of reason，或者是the cunning of the reasoner是主導此辯證遊戲的因素。此處，理性，reason，便是個複雜的問題。Reason, ratio, to think, to cause, 都在拉岡所說的主奴辯證遊戲中，或是S<sub>1</sub>與S<sub>2</sub>的關係中。然而，the reasoner的狡猾，會使得此辯證關係複雜化，其原因在於S<sub>1</sub>、S<sub>2</sub>、S、a的任何一項都可能佔據這個agent的位置。問題是：甚麼促使此agent行動？甚麼造成了這個迴轉的再次發生？<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> There is obviously no better way to pin down the master signifier, which is up there on the board, than by identifying it with death. And so, what is involved? It involves showing in a dialectic, as Hegel puts it, what it is that is the zenith, the highest point, the thought, of this term's function.” (Seminar XVII, Fr. 198)

<sup>19</sup> the succession of phases of dominance, of composition of the play of the mind [esprit], which runs the length of this thread that is not nothing, which up until his day was called philosophical thought—Hegel finds a way of showing that what results from this is that in the end it is the slave who, through his work, produces the master's truth, by pushing him down underneath. By virtue of this forced labour, as you see from the outset, the slave ends up, at the end of history, at this point called absolute knowledge.”  
(Seminar XVII, Fr. 198)

<sup>20</sup> “What makes this agent act? How is it possible to produce this extraordinary circuit around which what deserves, strictly speaking, to be designated by the term ‘revolution’ revolves?” (Seminar XVII, Fr. 199)

因此，當我們說，熱愛真理，這個「真理」已經是個複雜的問題。真理並不只有一個面孔。真理／真相被經驗，但是時常並不被知道。因此，透過符號化的發言／鏈結，在這個死亡的位置，不可能的真相才會冒出。

這就是爲甚麼我們對真理的愛，使得治理、教化以及分析往往引發欲望，而歇斯底里話語則是不可能的話語模式。

“For truth, as it happens, makes this signifier ‘death’ appear. And even, there is every appearance that if there is one thing that gives a completely different sense to what Hegel proposed, it is what Freud had nevertheless discovered at that time, which he characterized as best he could, as the death instinct, namely the radical character of repetition, this repetition that insists, and which characterizes the psychical reality, if there is such a thing, of this being inscribed in language.” (Seminar XVII, Fr. 200)

**Truth has more than one face.... Truth is experienced, this does not at all mean that it thereby knows [connait] any more about the real,** above all if one speaks about knowing, and if one bears in mind the features of the real that point out.”

“It is at the stage at which the register of a **symbolic articulation** was found to be **defined as the impossible to demonstrate to be true that the real is placed,** if the real is defined as the impossible. This may help us to take the measure of **our love for truth—and it may also enable us to put our finger on why governing, educating, analyzing also, and, why not, causing desire,** so as to complete the series which a definition of what **the discourse of the hysteric might be, are operations that, strictly speaking, are impossible.**” (Seminar XVII, Fr. 201)

Between us and the real, there is truth. (Seminar XVII, Fr. 202)



拉岡強調，無論agent的位置被哪一種主人表記所佔據，工作之產出永遠不會與真相有任何關係，這是他所說的impotence，無能力。

Whatever the signs, whatever the master signifiers that come to be inscribed in the place of the agent, under no circumstances will production have a relationship to truth. ... Each impossibility, whatever it may be, between the terms that we put in play here is always linked to this—if it leaves us in suspense over its truth, it is because **something is protecting it, which we shall call impotence.**” (Seminar XVII, Fr. 203)

E 話語與痛快感：陽性快感與陰性快感

拉岡在此四項式中並沒有替jouissance命名，這是無法命名者the unnamable one，而整個機制的結構正是建立在對此jouissance的禁制之上。因此，關鍵的問題便在於：這個jouissance是甚麼？這個無法命名者，就正是主體進入符號界，透過一個標記，而被紋身，被一個單一表記所標記銘刻，所產生的分裂。此主體的真相／真理，便是此表記下之分裂的根本曖昧處。所有的語言中設置了話語模式的秩序，都會留下一個縫隙，一個缺口。我們所描繪的，總是一個輪廓。但是，這卻會給我們一些起點。

**Jouissance is very precisely correlated with the initial form of the entry into play of what I am calling the mark, the unary trait, which is a mark for death, if you want to it its meaning. Observe that nothing takes on any meaning except when death comes into play.**

**It is on the basis of the cleavage, the separation, between jouissance and the henceforth mortified body, that from the moment that there is a play of inscriptions, a mark of the unary trait, that the question arises.** There is no need to wait until the subject has revealed itself well hidden, at the level of the master's truth. **The subject's division is**

**without doubt nothing other than the radical ambiguity that attaches itself to the very term, ‘truth.’**

**It is insofar as language, everything that institutes the order of discourse, leaves things in a gap that, in sum, we can be confident that in following our thread we are always doing nothing other than following a contour.** But it does bring us something extra, and it is the minimum it would be really necessary for us to know for a reply to the question with which I began, namely, what is currently going on at the level of the university discourse. (Seminar XVII, Fr. 206)

拉岡說，新教以降，不承認jouissance，而將快樂透過可計算的方式正式命名，納入價值體系，正是資本主義的問題，也是資本累積的起點：capital.

拉岡說，在真實與我們之間，有一個真相。真相是我們戰鬥的目的，而知識以症狀方式出現，使真相出現。大他者的場域，是真理得以銘刻之處。此處之結構性秩序，虛假，偽裝，謊言，都是在真相之基礎之上出現。在語言的自由遊戲中，透露著真理。所謂的四角結構，正是預設語言的話語結構與條件的秩序。真理不是其可見的面孔，而是在隱藏處。

“it is only from where knowledge is false that it concerns itself with truth. ... **Knowledge falls to the rank of symptom, seen from another perspective. And this is where truth comes in. For truth one fights, even though it is only produced through its relation to the real.** But the fact that it is produced is much less important than what is produced. The effect of truth is only a collapse of knowledge. It is this collapse that creates a production, soon to be taken up again.

**The locus of the Other, as I have always said, is made for truth to be inscribed there, that is, everything of that order, the false, even the lie—which only exists on the foundation of truth. This is in the free play of speech and language.**

But what about truth in **this quadrupedal structure? – which presupposes language and takes a discourse to be structured, that is, which conditions all speech able to be produced therein.** What does the truth in question, the truth of this discourse, that is, what it conditions, put in its place? How is it that the discourse of the master holds firm? This is the other face of the function of truth, not the visible face, but the dimension in which it is made necessarily by something that is hidden.

**Our furrows in the alethosphere** are traced out on the surface of the heavens, deserted long ago. ... (Seminar XVII, Fr. 216)

拉岡引用海德格討論真理的模式，使隱藏者揭開，*verborgtheit*，*concealment*。但是，越是要維護真理，越會陷入治理、教化與分析的工作，而無法靠近真理。真理與實驗、發現、捕捉、揭露無關，而與書寫有關，兩種不同關係的書寫。(Seminar XVII, Fr.

217)拉岡說， $S_1$  是縫合點(*Quilting points*)，是我們尋找真相的切入點。也就是說，說話的主體，告訴了我們真相。

拉岡說的生命的痛快感，正是建立在表記體系之內的。他曾經說，**jouissance就是思想，思想本身就是jouissance，就是being的jouissance** (Seminar XX 70)。這是十分重要的關鍵概念。

But it cannot be ambiguous that I oppose to the concept of being – as it is sustained in the philosophical tradition, that is, as rooted in the very thinking that is supposed to be its correlate – the notion that we are duped (*joués*) by *jouissance*.

**Thought is jouissance. What analytic discourse contributes is the following, and it is already hinted at in the philosophy of being: there is jouissance of being.**

(Seminar XX 70)

拉岡曾經強調，如果要使用「存有」這個概念，being，他所指的存有是「表記性的存有」，**being of signifierness**。(Seminar XX

71)他以Democritus的原子論來描述存有，存有的表記如同會飛的原子，而會飛的表記構成了存有的物質性：

“In fact, the atom is simply an element of flying signifierness, quite simply a στοιχείο [cell, element, ghost; element, principal constituent, letter, part of speech]. Except that it is extremely difficult to make it work out right when one retains only what makes the element an element, namely, the fact that it is unique, whereas one should introduce the other a little bit, namely, difference.” (Seminar XX 71, Fr. 67)

以此觀點，人這個小宇宙就是由表記的集合所組成。一切都要置於表記的層次來理解。從表記出發，才能夠開始討論無中生有的創造，*Ex nihilo*，以及拉岡所說的Be-eternal-ing (40)。

拉岡指出，現實只有透過語言才得以面對，而語言也就是獲得享受痛快的機制。“Reality is approached with apparatuses of jouissance.” (Seminar XX 55)這種痛快感是並應該有／卻從不會失敗的痛快，總是會在語言中發生，語言會工作(work)，而獲得此痛快感。這就是語言的用處。

The necessary is linked to the impossible, and this “doesn’t stop not being written” is the articulation thereof. What is produced is the jouissance that shouldn’t be/could never fail. That is the correlate of the fact that there’s no such thing as a sexual relationship, and it is the substantial aspect of the phallic function. (Seminar XX 59, Fr. 55)

**Were there another one, but there is no other than phallic jouissance – except the one concerning which woman doesn't breathe a word, perhaps because she doesn't know it, the one that makes her not-whole.”** (Seminar XX 60, Fr. 56)

“Another satisfaction is the one that answers to the jouissance that was barely (*juste*) required, just enough (*juste*) for it to happen between what I will abbreviate by calling them man and woman. **In other words, the satisfaction that answers to phallic jouissance.”** (Seminar XX 64, Fr. 61)

拉岡在Seminar

VII中討論超我式的享受命令式：超我與閹割相互關連，而閹割則是對於大他者的享受的承認知符號，承認大他者的身體是欲望的對象。

**“The superego, which I qualified earlier as based on the (imperative) ‘Enjoy!’, is a correlate of castration**, the latter being the sign with which an avowal dresses itself up, the avowal that jouissance of the Other, of the body of the Other, is promoted only on the basis of infinity.” (Seminar XX 7-8, Fr. 13)

拉岡說，對男人而言，這個x只以被閹割之註記出現，並因此而獲得陽形痛快。

As for *x* – in other words, what man would be if the sexual relationship could be written in a sustainable way, a way that is sustainable in a discourse – man is but a signifier because where he comes into play as a signifier, he comes in only *quoad castrationem*, in other words, insofar as he has **a relation to phallic jouissance.”** (Seminar XX 35, Fr. 36)

至於女人，女人是不完全的。這是個複雜的概念。拉岡強調沒有大寫的女人，大寫的女人只等同於普世性。拉岡在1970年到71年的講座中提出「女人不存在」(*la femme n'existe pas*) 的說法，在S20“**God and Woman's jouissance**”改為「並沒有大寫女人這一回事」(*il*

*n'y a pas La*

*femme*)。拉岡要質疑的是在女人這個名詞之前的定冠詞，也就是作為普遍性的女人。拉岡要刪除這個定冠詞，就好像要刪除 A，以便提出被劃線的大寫他者的符號。在拉岡的理論中，女人就像是真理，因為兩者都具有不全然的邏輯，不可能說出「全然無缺的真理」。女人如同大寫他者一樣，都並不存在。女人是「不全然」(*not-all, pas-tout*)。女人可以經驗到「超越陽形」的痛快，但她們對此卻一無所知。陽性特質以陽形的(閹割作用)為基礎形成其普遍的功能，而女人具有的是非普遍性。

It grounds itself as being not-whole in situating itself in the phallic function. That is what defines what? Woman precisely, except that Woman can only be written with a bar through it. There's no such thing as Woman, Woman with a capital W indicating the universal. There's no such thing as Woman because, in her essence ..... she is not whole. (Seminar XX 72-73, Fr. 68)

女人沒有表記，女人是表記闕如的表記，*la femme*是一個指向闕如的表記。The lack of a signifier, the signifier of the lack of a signifier。女人只能夠是被排除的，是不完整的，她的痛快感是額外溢出的，而不是補足性的。女人讓自己滿足。

“Woman” (*la*) is a signifier, the crucial property (proper) of which is that it is the only one that cannot signify anything, and this is simply because it grounds woman's status in the fact that she is not-whole. That means we can't talk about Woman (*La femme*).

.....

A woman can but be excluded by the nature of things, which is the nature of words, .....

The fact remains that if she is excluded by the nature of things, it is precisely in the following respect: being not-whole, she has a supplementary jouissance compared to what the phallic function designates by way of jouissance.

.....

Women content themselves, any woman contents herself, being not-whole, with the jouissance in question and, well, generally speaking, we would be wrong not to see that, contrary to what people say, it is nevertheless they who possess men. (Seminar XX 73, Fr. 68)

It is not because she is not-wholly in the phallic function that she is not there at all. **She is not not at all there. She is there in full (à plein). But there is something more (*en plus*).** (Seminar XX 74, Fr. 69)

這個屬於她的痛快感，她並不知道，僅能夠經驗，只有在其到來之時才知道。這個痛快感並不降臨於所有人之上：

There is a jouissance that is hers (à elle), that belongs to that “she” (elle) that doesn’t exist and doesn’t signify anything. There is a jouissance that is hers about which she herself perhaps knows nothing if not that she experiences it – that much she knows. She knows it, of course, when it comes (arrive). It doesn’t happen (arrive) to all of them. (Seminar XX 74, Fr. 69)

這個只有經驗到時才知道，卻又無法說出的陰性狂喜，如同神祕主義。拉岡說，他願意將自己的書寫放在神祕主義者的書單中。這就是他所相信的上帝，是女人的狂喜。這個狂喜，使我們脫離存在，*ex-sistence*，而經驗了存有的痛快感：

You are all going to be convinced that I believe in God. **I believe in the jouissance of woman insofar as it is extra (en plus)**, as long as you put a screen in front of this ‘extra’ until I have been able to properly explain it.


Doesn't this jouissance once experiences and yet knows nothing about put us on **the path of ex-sistence? And why not interpret one face of the Other, the God face, as based on feminine jouissance?** (Seminar XX 77, Fr.71)

此處，拉岡所反覆強調的，就是存有的痛快感，是依賴於存有的表記性之上的痛快。

As all of that is produced thanks to the being of signifierness, and as that being has no other locus than the locus of the Other (Autre) that I designate with capital A, one sees the **cross-sightedness** that results. **And as that is also where the father function is inscribed, insofar as castration is related to the father function, we see that that doesn't make two Gods (deux Dieu), but that it doesn't make just one either.** (Seminar XX 77, Fr.71)

拉岡說，這個存有的表記性所產出的痛快感，其所坐落的場域就在大他者的場域，而此處正是兩種不同的大他者的雙重視域重疊之處。這個大他者的場域，the locus of the Other, 這個交錯重疊的視域cross-eyedness, cross-sightedness, double-vision，就是我們對於大他者發生錯誤想像的原因。在此處，父親功能被銘刻，閹割因此發生，但是，因父親功能而發生的閹割，卻會引發不同的神的想像，或是不同的主體的建立。





拉岡說，

意義則是在其所不及之處。也就是說，是關於 $S_2$ 的問題，也就是有關知識的問題。

Today I am going to try to speak about knowledge, about that knowledge which ... I symbolized by writing  $S_2$ . (Seminar XX 78, Fr. 73)

Meaning (sens) indicates the direction toward which it fails. (Seminar XX 79, Fr. 74)

拉岡說，每一個說話者都會將自己置於這個公式中左邊或是右邊(Every speaking being situates itself on one side or the other.)。左邊是陽性位置，右邊是陰性位置。(On the other side, you have the inscription of the woman portion of speaking beings. p. 80)

左上角的第二行所顯示的， $\forall x \Phi x$ ，表示所有的(∀)男人x，都需要透過陽形功能，Φ，而獲得一個銘刻(inscription)，以便成為完整，而條件是這個陽形功能被限制，有一個x的存在(∃ x)否定了Φx的功能。這就是父親功能，同時也是現實原則。拉岡說，此處的運作受到右上角最後項的決定，也就是Φx功能的被否定，也就是說，透過否定，Φx的否定，閹割的狀態被建立，從而性欲關係才有其基礎。(79-80)  $\forall x \Phi x$  —every x is a function of Φx. (p. 71, Fr. 67)

也就是說，每個男人都處於陽形的位置，已經被閹割／剝除其力量，如此才會有陽形痛快感，如果沒有陽形功能之被拒絕，就不會有在此符號界中的快感。

“There is no chance for a man to have jouissance of a woman’s body, otherwise stated, for him to make love, without castration (à moins de castration), in other words, without something that says no to the phallic function.” (Seminar XX 72, Fr. 67)

如果以比較簡單的說法重新說一次他的式子，就會是：陽形功能的否定，也就是閹割，父之法的建立，現實原則的介入，而先決定了所有人的存在。人以此符號式的閹割而出現。人的表記，就是自我銘刻此閹割。

右上角的式子中，我們看到的是說話主體的女性成分(the woman portion of speaking beings)。無論是男性或是女性，(masculinity or not)，都可以處於此說話主體的位置。如果說話主體處於此處，就不會容許任何的普世性，因為它必然是不全的(a not-whole)。這就是所謂語言中的陽性部分與陰性部分。

**Any speaking whatsoever, ... is allowed to inscribe itself in this part.** If it inscribes itself there, it will **not allow for any universality** – it will be a not-whole, insofar as it has the choice of positing itself in  $\Phi x$  or not being there. (Seminar XX 80)

**Those are the only possible definition of the so-called man or woman portion for that which finds itself in the position of inhabiting language.** (Seminar XX 80)

如果我們按照拉岡自己解釋左上角的方式，試圖翻譯右上角的式子，我們會得到以下的說法：陽形功能仍舊是被否定的，但是，不是所有的人都選擇處於 $\Phi x$ 的位置，也就是具有陽形功能的說話主體。於是，一個不存在的說話主體出現了。一個女人。於是，橫線的下方，左邊是男人，是被劃了橫槓的主體，而 $\Phi$ 是支撐他而使其成為表記的功能，這個被劃橫槓的主體以 $S_1$ 的形象出現。這個第一表記， $S_1$ ，並沒有所表記之項，本身便是一個意義的失敗。它是一半的意義。

拉岡曾經說明，被我思主體所看到的「我」就是第一表記， $S_1$ ，這是一個單一表記，the unary trait，第一個「我」的出現。因此， $S_1$ 可以被視為「我」的認同系列(series of

identifications) —S(i(a,a', a'',

a''', ...), 我們曾經說過,  $S_1$ 是 $S$ 進入已經被表記體系構成的符號界而被隔離時的表記。這個 $S_1$ 出現的時刻, 也就是主體分裂的時刻。此處,  $S_1$ 與 $S$ 所構成的說話活動, 有一個相對的 $A$ , 所謂大他者的場域。

拉岡說, 在陽性的說話者位置中, 是一個被橫槓阻隔的主體。這個分裂的主體有 $\Phi$ 這個符號陽具(symbolic phallus)做為支撐。在我出現的第一表記中,  $S_1$ , 也銘刻著這個代替閹割的符號陽具。這個分裂主體只有尋找 $a$ 作為對象。但是, 他卻無法獲得他的性欲伴侶, 那個在分離線另外一邊的大他者。此處,  $S$ 與 $a$ 的連結, 就只是幻見。主體在此幻見中被捕獲, 而這正是佛洛伊德所說的現實原則。(Seminar XX 80)

On the side of man, I have inscribed  $S$ , certainly not to privilege him in any way, and the  $\Phi$  that props him up as signifier and is also incarnated in  $S_1$ , which, of all the signifiers, is the signifier for which there is no signified, and which, with respect to meaning (*sens*), symbolizes the failure thereof. It is 'half-sense,' 'inde-sense' *par excellence*, or if you will allow me again, 'reti-sense.' This  $S$ , thus doubled by that signifier on which, in the end, it does not even depend, this  $S$  never deals with anything by way of a partner but object  $a$  inscribed on the other side of the bar. (Seminar XX 80, Fr. 75)

也就是說, 在現實原則之下, 主體依循符號法則所容許的條件追尋此 $a$ , 但是, 這個在符號體系之下出現的分裂主體與 $a$ 的結合, 只是幻見。這個 $a$ 可以經由不同面貌出現, 而且是 $\Phi$ 所支撐的現實條件之下被定義的特別優勢。

拉岡說, 大他者之處, 不僅只是真理結結巴巴出現之處。這個大他者永遠是個大他者, 全然異於我者。拉岡說過, 大他者沒有其大他者。這個作為所有表記發生之起點的大他者是最為根本的相異, 其自身沒有另外的大他者。於是, 女人作為大他者之表記, 標記了劃了一道橫槓的大他者:  $S(A)$

Woman has a relation to the signifier of that Other, insofar as, qua Other, it can but remain forever Other. I can only assume here that you will recall my statement that there is no Other of the Other. The Other, that is, the locus in which everything that can be articulated on the basis of the signifier comes to be inscribed, is, in its foundation, the Other in the most radical sense. That is why the signifier, with this open parenthesis, marks the Other as barred : S (A) (81, Fr. 75)

女人不可被說。女人是不全然的，因為她仍舊與 $\Phi$ 有聯繫。這個 $\Phi$ 是決定陽形快感的優勢位置。圖表右下角從~~Woman~~出發的兩條箭頭，說明了女人與S (A)有關連，也可能與 $\Phi$ 有關連。

That is nevertheless what is written on the blackboard with the arrow that begins from ~~Woman~~. ~~Woman~~ cannot be said (*se dire*). Nothing can be said of woman. Woman has a relation with S (A), and it is already in that respect that she is doubled, that she is not-whole, since she can also have a relation with  $\Phi$ . (Seminar XX 81, Fr. 75)

**I designate  $\Phi$  as the phallus insofar as I indicate that it is the signifier that has no signified, the one that is based, in the case of man, on phallic jouissance.** What is the latter if not the following, which the importance of masturbation in our practice highlights sufficiently – the jouissance of the idiot ? (Seminar XX 81, Fr. 75)

但是，對她而言，這個 $\Phi$ 是她可以選擇放棄的。她可以選擇不存在，不以陽形優勢的位置出現，不以完整的形象出現。

If it inscribes itself there, it will **not allow for any universality** – it will be a not-whole, insofar as it has the choice of positing itself in  $\Phi$ x or not being there. (Seminar XX 80, Fr. 75)

拉岡所說明的陰性位置，就是所謂的無意識的場域、大他者、符號界、表記體系、表義鍊，以及他所說的表記群 (battery of signifiers)，說明了大他者A是無法被得知的，只能夠由某一個小他者來得知，或是無數的表記，無數的 $a$ 。S<sub>2</sub>既是是另一個表記，被揚棄而退隱的另一個，但是，也是知識所朝向的未知處。S<sub>2</sub>可以被視為意義的系列(series of meanings)——O.s, s', s'', s''', ...。S<sub>2</sub>這個意義的系列，也就是拉岡所說的「知識」，savoir。這個意義匯聚處的知識，拉岡稱呼為「大他者的痛快感」(the Other's jouissance)。拉岡說，這個知識不是限定範疇與系統的知識，而是脫離系統，對於意義的追求，對於真相的理解，此知識的本身就是極限

In doing so, we are no doubt leaving behind what knowledge authentically is, what is recognizable as knowledge, and referring to the limits, to the field of these limits as such, the field that Freud's words dare to confront." Seminar XVII, p. 5

拉岡指出，這個極限處的知識，是「剩餘的享樂」(surplus enjoyment)，而這個特別的痛快感必須維持為不透明的狀態。他的說法是：

At the intersection of a jouissance—and not just any jouissance, it must no doubt remain opaque—at the intersection of a jouissance that is privileged above all others—not because it is sexual jouissance, since what this jouissance designates by being at this intersection is the loss of sexual jouissance, castration—in relation to this meeting point with sexual jouissance there emerges, in the Freudian fable of repetition, the engendering of something radical that gives body to a schema that is, literally, articulated. **S<sub>1</sub>, having emerged at the first moment, is repeated with respect to S<sub>s</sub>.** The subject emerges from this entry into a relation, **the subject that something, a certain loss, represents.** And it is worth having made this effort in the direction of meaning in order to comprehend the ambiguity. (Seminar XVII, p. 8)

因此，由於失落的某物， $S_1$ 重複出現，其重複出現的方式，是依著 $S_1$ 與 $S_2$ 的關係。 $S_2$ 代表此失落之物所在之處，而 $a$ 則是其表記。這個失落的對象，就是那個無法填補的裂縫，是一個被打開的洞，a gap, a

hole。朝向這個未知的洞之欲望，就是知識在極限處的過剩痛快感。無意識的工作，就是在製造此剩餘的價值，此過剩的痛快感。

關於符號的陽性位置與陰性位置，拉岡於1975年1月21日在法國巴黎第八大學 University of Paris VIII的講座，有一些很重要的補充說明：

1. 首先，他強調符號形式的重要性：我們需要符號層，以便理解其中錯綜交織的想像層與真實面。“[The borromean knots and its circular figure] the symbolic符號層可以提供一個形式，協助我們將真實與想像納入符號形勢之中。bring into the real its share of the imaginary.( Lacan, “Seminar of 21 January 1975,” 163)  
他強調，想像與真實並不可以截然二分：“It would ..... be a mistake to think that it is the imaginary which is mortal and the real which is the living.” (165)
2. 其次，他強調a的重要性：沒有小客體，就無法理解主體。因為，沒有a，也就沒有欲望，沒有思想，沒有對象，換句話說，也就沒有存有的生命快感。如果有個主體，這個主體是經由對象而發生的。這個引發主體的對象／客體，並不是知識中的他者。這個對象／客體將此他者劃除。這個他者便是大他者。**“Without the *petit a*, something is missing from any possible reference or appearance of harmony. And why? Because the subject is only ever supposed. It is its condition to be only supposable. If it knows anything, it is only by being itself a subject caused by an object – which is not what it knows, that is, what it imagines it knows. The object which causes it is not the other of knowledge [connaissance]. The object crosses this other through. The other is thus the Other, which I write with a capital O.”**(Lacan, “Seminar of 21 January 1975,”164)
3. 他也說明了大他者的雙面性。這個作為雙重母體(dual entry

matrix)的A：小客體構成了大他者的其中一個進入點，這是朝向意義的入口，而另外一個進入點，則是做為「一」的表記( $S_1$ )。“The Other is a dual entry matrix. The *petit a* constitutes one of its entries. As for the other, what can be said about it? Is it the One of the signifier?”

(164)此處，拉岡解釋了為什麼必然要透過 $S_1$ ，也同時要透過 $a$ ，才能夠理解此大他者，此無意識的場域。作為意義的「一」與作為表記的「一」不能混為一談。意義的「一」：是存有，是無意識的「站出—存有」，此「站出—存有」是不協調的，無意識便是不協調的。無意識正是透過說話而決定了作為存有的主體，但是，這是個要被劃去的主體，被欲望所劃去。The One of meaning is the being, the being specified by the unconscious inasmuch as it **ex-ists**, ex-ists at least to the body, for the striking thing is that it ex-ists in discord. The unconscious is discordant. The unconscious is that which, by speaking, determines the subject as being, but as a being to be crossed through with that metonymy by which I support desire, in so far as it is endless impossible to speak as such.”  
(. (Lacan, “Seminar of 21 January 1975,” 165)

4. 因此，語言是我們靠近存有的重要依據。拉岡說，語言是裝飾襯托性的，是說話的修辭。語言說出的，不是音素的組合，而是被欲望與存有所決定的主體。“Language is an adorning. It is all rhetoric, as Descartes stresses in the tenth rule. Dialectics can be conceived of only through the usage that it has in relation to a pathematically ordered common use, that is to say, to **a discourse associating not the phoneme, even taken in its broadest sense, but the subject determined by being, that is to say, by desire.**”  
(. (Lacan, “Seminar of 21 January 1975,” 165-66)

5.  $F(x)$ ：無意識的一部分，可以透過字母／元素翻譯，只有這個字母可以限定我與我的同一，或是我的出現——“I say the function of the symptom, function to be understood as the  $f$  of the mathematical formula  $f(x)$ . And what is the  $x$ ? It is that part of the unconscious, which can be translated by a letter, in that only the letter makes it possible to isolate the identity of self to self from any quality.” (. (Lacan, “Seminar of 21 January 1975,” 166)

6. 症狀就是「站出—存有」的情感：**affect of ex-isting, “What is it, of the unconscious, which makes for ex-istence? It is what I underline with the support of the symptom.”**無意識是透過表記而組成的。每一個無意識都可以透過字母而寫出，正如症狀。“By underpinning the signifier which the unconscious consists of, each One of the unconscious is capable of being written down by a letter.” (.( Lacan, “Seminar of 21 January 1975,”166)
7. 符號陽形，*phallus*，是個沒有痛快感的器官。符號陽形並不是陽性痛快感。*The phallus is not phallic jouissance*. Is it, therefore, *jouissance* without the organ or the organ without *jouissance*? I am putting questions to you in this form in order to give some meaning – regretfully – to this figure. And, making the leap, for whoever is encumbered with the *phallus*, what is a woman? (.( Lacan, “Seminar of 21 January 1975,”168)
8. 女人是一個症狀。**A woman is a symptom.** (.( Lacan, “Seminar of 21 January 1975,”168)
9. 大他者沒有痛快，大他者的身體的痛快是沒有保障的，因此根本無法證實此可提供痛快的大他者之存在。*The fact that a woman is a symptom can be seen from the structure which I am in the process of explaining to you, namely, that there is no jouissance of the Other as such, no guarantee to be met with in the jouissance of the body of the Other, to ensure that enjoying the Other exists. A manifest instance of the hole, or rather of something whose only support is the objet a – but always in a mix-up or confusion.* (.( Lacan, “Seminar of 21 January 1975,”168)
10. 女人與男人都一樣，都可以是個*objet a* In point of fact a woman is no more an *objet a* than is a man .....To make of this A-Woman a symptom, is to say that phallic *jouissance* is equally her affair, contrary to what is said. (.( Lacan, “Seminar of 21 January 1975,”168)
11. 女人與男人一樣，都會經驗到閹割。*The woman has to undergo no more or less castration than the man. As for what is involved in her function as symptom, she is at exactly the same point as her man. We have yet to articulate what corresponds in her case to that real ex-istence I spoke of earlier as the phallus, the one over which I left you with your*



tongues hanging out.” (Lacan, “Seminar of 21 January 1975,” 168)

- A father only has a right to respect, if not love, if the said love, the said respect, is - .....  
perversely [père-versement] oriented, that is to say, come of a woman, an *objet a* who causes  
his desire. (Lacan, “Seminar of 21 January 1975,” 167)
- But what the woman thereby *a*-quires has no part in the matter. What she busies herself  
with are other *objet a*, being children, in relation to whom the father does none the less  
intervene – exceptionally in the best instances – in order to keep under repression, in the  
happy medium [le juste milieu], his own version of his **perversion [père-  
version]. Perversion [père-version] being the sole guarantee of his function of father,  
which is the function of the symptom, as I have written it.** (Lacan, “Seminar of 21  
January 1975,” 167)