

Immanentism, Double Abjection, and the Politics of Psyche in (Post)Colonial Taiwan

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This essay discusses what I define as the psyche politics employed in the discourse of identity and of subjectivity in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period (1895–1945), and how the use of such politics of psyche recurred in an uncanny way in postcolonial Taiwan, especially during recent decades.¹ I translate the term *xin* here as “psyche,” instead of the mind or the heart, because in Chinese *xin* means at the same time the mental, affective, and spiritual dimensions, involving conscious and unconscious processes. I use *psyche politics* to refer to the discursive operations of molding, shaping, fashioning, policing, and governing of this interior mind-affect-spirit continuum. When we consider such psyche politics against the Althusserian notion of subject, or the Foucaultian notion of the process of subjectivation, we notice that, instead of the ideological interpellation or the practice of biopolitics, the discourse of *xin* plays a much more penetrating and prevailing role in

the Chinese and the Japanese contexts that constituted the formation of the Taiwanese subject, both the imperial subject in Japanese colonial times and the nativized Taiwanese subject of today.

The Chinese *xin*, like the Japanese *gokoro*, serves as a token to be invested and exchanged for various political values, especially in cases of modern nationalism. For example, in the beginning of the twentieth century, the phrase *xinli*, literally “psyche force,” as well as the phrase *zhixin*, connoting both “mind-cure” and “mind-governmentality,” were welcomed by Chinese intellectuals and revolutionaries, including Liang Qichao, Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yatsen), Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek), and Mao Zedong, when they launched the project of nation building and the fortification of the concept of national subject.² Masao Maruyama also had impressively analyzed the paradoxical shift of the connotation of the *gokoro* (heart/soul/spirit) in Japanese culture in his criticism of Japanese nationalism. He had shown that, in order to rid themselves of the influence of Chinese Confucian rationalism, the Japanese thinkers, especially Motoori Norinaga, searched for the *Yamato-gokoro*, the “Japanese heart or the Japanese spirit,” in the eighteenth century, as distinct from the *kara-gokoro*, the “Chinese spirit.” The *Yamato-gokoro* for Motoori was defined as true, simple, natural, and original, but Masao Maruyama pointed out that this appeal to the *Yamato-gokoro* turned out to be the basis for Japanese nationalism.³

Such investment in the interior essence is what Jean-Luc Nancy has called “immanentism”: “the goal of achieving a community of beings producing in essence their own essence as their work, and furthermore producing precisely this essence as community.”⁴ That is to say, the essence of man is fashioned and regulated so that a community of shared immanence can be thinkable. Subsequently, Nancy explains, “economic ties, technological operations, and political fusion (into a *body* or under a *leader*) represent or rather present, expose, and realize this essence necessarily in themselves”⁵ (emphasis in original). For Nancy, *immanentism* is a better term than *totalitarianism* because it does not limit itself to certain types of societies or political regimes but rather reveals the fundamental mentality of our time.

I find Nancy’s concept of immanentism very powerful in explaining the *technē* of the formation of subject and the self-fashioning mode of the constitution of communities. But I prefer the term *psyche politics*, particularly in

Chinese and Taiwanese contexts. When a certain abstract quality is defined as the immanent essence or psyche of the national subject and serves as the external delineation for the community, individual differences tend to be ignored. This immanent quality or psyche can be defined accordingly along with the change of political ideology. In the case of Taiwan, the discourse of *xin* has undergone drastic and symbolic changes, especially during the Japanese colonial period (1895–1945) and during recent decades under the DPP government.⁶ A particular mode of *xin*, the immanent essence or the spirit of the national subject, is demanded, and this mode of *xin* requires the effacement and abjection of the old self.⁷ To me, such discursive self-effacement and self-abjection, present in literary texts, cultural policies, and public discourses, appears to be the indispensable threshold for the process of subjectivation. I would like to suggest that the stage of discursive self-abjection, or the will to cleanse the heart and forsake one's old self, is crucial for the process of subject formation to be completed, or even to begin. Moreover, I shall explain in my essay that it is this sadomasochistic self-effacement that energizes one to conform to the symbolic, to purge one's interior uncleanness, to become a non-I subject, while enjoying a sense of happiness and fulfillment. More significantly, the reverse side of the self-abjection is the discourse of the *gong*, the public good that is shared by all. These two symbiotic states, self-abjection and participating in the *gong*, to my mind, constructed the particular mode of discourse of the psyche in East Asia during the Pacific War, which paved the way for the notion of *gong* that is defined by the framework of the modern nation-state. This locus of the *gong*, which often is erected in the name of love in order to uphold a sense of community, paradoxically serves the cause for cruelty against difference, both outside and inside the community. The abjection hence goes in double directions: the internal effacement and the external exclusion. Through such discursive mode of psyche politics, a certain sense of community is engineered.

The Yoshinori Kobayashi Event and the Double Mirror

I shall begin my discussion with the case of Yoshinori Kobayashi's graphic history *On Taiwan*.⁸



年輕世代對於彼此的
次文化產生興趣，
這可說是件好事！
但是這種現象僅止於
表象的層次嗎？

回溯過去
彼此曾經共同
走過的歷史：

我們終將瞭解到，
自己究竟是什麼人？
自己在歷史的過程中，
佚失了什麼
重要的記憶？

In Yoshinori Kobayashi's *On Taiwan*, opening up the door that faced the map of Japan and Taiwan embracing one another, the reporter-narrator said: "Tracing the past history that we've shared together, we'll finally understand who we are and what memories we've lost." He then began his journey to Taiwan.⁹

Yoshinori Kobayashi's graphic history *On Taiwan*, which appeared in 2001, provides interesting materials for us to look into this issue of subjectivity. The work presents itself as both a travelogue and a history book, professing to retrace the histories that were commonly shared by Japan and Taiwan in the first half of the twentieth century. Kobayashi himself appears in the book as a reporter: he visits places in Taiwan; glorifies the modern technologies, policies, agricultural constructions, and urban architectural styles brought by the Japanese colonial government; and interviews various people, including former presidents Li Denghui and Chen Shuibian, the politically influential entrepreneur Xu Wenlong, and many others. Kobayashi's comments on the historical, political, and cultural issues of Taiwan show not only his support for Taiwan's independence but also his intention to reignite the Japanese spirit (*Riben jingshen*) among young people, justify the second Sino-Japanese War (1938–45), and rewrite the history of that war.¹⁰ Kobayashi's book therefore aroused strong reactions in both China and Taiwan, though for different reasons. Criticism in China mainly targeted Kobayashi's interpretation of the Nanjing Massacre, which was in line with a common belief among contemporary right-wing Japanese that Japanese people today should not feel ashamed by their fathers' or their grandfathers' conviction that the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere¹¹ was a just cause or their opinion that the number of victims of the Nanjing Massacre has been exaggerated.¹² Such remarks angered people in China and prompted vehement protests.¹³ A Qi Mei factory in Zhenjiang, China, was forced to close after the company's founder, Xu Wenlong, voiced support for Kobayashi's comments about "comfort women."¹⁴

The reactions in Taiwan to Kobayashi's book were of a totally different nature. From the outset, the debates aroused by *On Taiwan* were also aimed at the historical interpretation of the wartime experience, particularly concerning the position of comfort women, whom Kobayashi said had volunteered to serve the nation and that consequently their families viewed such opportunities with gratitude. Protestors went into the streets claiming to protect these women's honor.¹⁵ But offshoots of emotional conflict surfaced along with these debates. Loud, angry voices in the media and on Web sites called for the book to be banned and used phrases such as "traitors,"

“enslaving education,” and “generations of the imperial subjects” to attack those who expressed support for Kobayashi. Kobayashi was even forbidden to enter Taiwan for the press conference on the publication of his new book.¹⁶ On the other hand, equally strong voices welcomed Kobayashi’s idealistic and nostalgic depiction of Taiwan, saying he had presented a convincing case for colonial modernity and demonstrated his understanding and appreciation of the virtues of the Taiwanese people. To them, Kobayashi’s view presented a “Taiwanese perspective.” Some of Kobayashi’s supporters even voiced the suspicion that protests against him were actually aimed at overthrowing President Chen Shuibian’s government.¹⁷

Though he was commenting on Taiwan, Kobayashi was apparently addressing his Japanese contemporaries.¹⁸ He wanted to present Taiwan as the site that still remains the perfect embodiment of the “Japanese spirit” that he would like the Japanese to revive. Taiwanese people, according to him, are courteous, punctual, sincere, law-abiding, hardworking, and selfless—the very image of how the Japanese used to view themselves. Therefore, from a different perspective, this book could also be seen as serving as a tour guide for Japanese seeking a lost place of Japanese virtues. It is no wonder that critics have pointed out that his nostalgia is directed toward his own generation.

The most striking features of Kobayashi’s book, however, are found in his fascist views on the national subject and issues of identity and how these views resonate with, and even mirror the views of, many Taiwanese. Kobayashi said: “The question of national identity is the same as self identity. Where do I belong? Who am I? What is my existence? These are the most important questions that every modern person has to face. We have to answer to the question as to whether national belonging and national identity still exist.”¹⁹ To him, the meaning of an individual’s existence is defined only by the nation. He also insists that it is not consanguinity that determines national identity, but spiritual inheritance and national language. He complimented Li Denghui as the best inheritor of the Japanese spirit, saying Li exemplifies *ziwo zhi si* (the death of the self).²⁰ The strange logic that equates

the “death of the self” and the “Japanese spirit” as articulated by Kobayashi appeals to a particular rationale of immanentism. I shall come back to this question later but, for now, will point out that such immanentism requires that the spiritual essence constituting the nation is the spiritual inheritance said to be shared by everyone in the community and also note that the partaking of such abstract spirituality demands the voiding of the interior of an individual so that it can be replaced by the abstract spirit. The emptying out of the interior requires the discursive creation of the interior’s content. That is to say, the subject in the *kominka* (imperial subject) movement has first to be educated in such a way that he knows the necessity of cleansing his “barbarian heart” so that he can prove his loyalty to the emperor and share in the purity of the Japanese spirit. The “barbarian heart,” the so-called *yidi zhi xin*, is a concept borrowed from the term *zunwang rangyi* (honoring the emperor and riding off the barbarians). Here, the enemies to be gotten rid of are not the foreigners of neighboring countries, but the internal alien and uncultivated elements that do not fit into the emperor’s system. In this way, a psyche that is fashionable, cleansable, and correctable is constructed through education in the *kominka* discourse. When the subject of Taiwan is summoned, it is to prove the purity of the subject’s thoughts and spirit, his loyalty to the emperor, to the extent that he will even fight for the emperor. The emperor is waiting for the subject’s devotion and sacrifice; so, when the emperor defines *gong* as the prosperity of greater Asia, the subject should be willing to fight for that holy cause. Thus, the creation of the psyche of the subject, or the immanent spirit of the individual, is to meet the gaze of the Asia-conquering emperor as the Absolute Subject, as phrased by Louis Althusser in his formulation of the relationship between the subject and the state apparatus. The Japanese spirit as a double-processed immanentism, the denouncement of the primary uncultivated Taiwanese/Chineseness, and the identification with the *gong*, the sacred Japanese spirit is, therefore, the key to the understanding of identity in colonial Taiwan. Also, this immanent nature is imagined with the frame-set of the map of Asia — that is, the law of the *gong* — that would make conquering China part of its project.



Looking into the mirror that reflects his own image and the map of Japan, the reporter-narrator said: “The existence of myself—who am I? This is the question that every modern person has to face. We have to answer the question as to whether national belonging and national identity still exist! The Japanese should have the courage to face themselves! Let’s take a good look at Taiwan!”²¹

Even though Kobayashi’s intention was clearly nostalgic on his part, what he looked for in Taiwan actually corresponded to the Taiwanese people’s own self-expectations. Many Taiwanese, especially those who grew up during the colonial era, would like to present themselves as Kobayashi depicted them: lawful, punctual, diligent, clean, and so on. The Japanese spirit Kobayashi painstakingly illustrates in his graphic history is a concept, according to former president Li Denghui, fully understood by Taiwanese. Indeed, Li is described in the book as the one who truly inherited the Japanese spirit. After Kobayashi’s book was published in Taiwan, Li even expressed his willingness to visit Japan to give lectures for Japanese students on the essence of the Japanese spirit.²² Three years later, in 2004, he pub-

lished a book on the spirit of the samurai (*bushido*).²³ Jin Meiling, a politician associated with the Taiwan independence movement, explained that *Riben jingshen* (Japanese spirit) is a phrase “circulated throughout all corners in Taiwan,” and that “everyone would understand the meaning of ‘Riben jingshen’ whenever it is uttered.”²⁴ According to Jin, for most Taiwanese, *Riben jingshen* refers not only to nostalgia for the Japanese era but also to a more general suggestion of the qualities of “cleanliness, justice, honesty, diligence, trustworthiness, responsibility, lawfulness, service to the state, and the effacing of the self.”²⁵ For Jin and many Taiwanese, *Riben jingshen* suggests modernity — as opposed to dirtiness, cheating, laziness, superstitions, and irresponsibility — and contains the qualities a decent modern citizen of the nation should display.

Other Taiwanese people, however, especially those who settled there after 1949 and did not share this Japanese experience, have more ambivalent feelings toward the so-called Japanese spirit. They do not want to see Taiwanese identities mixed with the the Japanese colonial experience. The ambivalent attitude toward the Japanese-colonial past is most obviously revealed in the heated debates within Taiwanese literary studies. The corpus of literary works written in the colonial era, in Japanese and tinted with the Japanese identities, grouped as *kominka* literature, was not considered as Taiwanese literature and ignored entirely for half a century. Serious studies of *kominka* literature did not enter the scholarly arena until the late 1990s, and even then not without resistance. In 1998, Zhang Liangze published an article “Zhengshi Taiwan wenxueshi shangde nanti: guanyu Taiwan Kominka wenxue zuopin shiyi” (“Facing the Aporia in Taiwan Literary History: Concerning the Collection of Taiwan *Kominka* literature) in the newspaper *Lianhe bao* (*The United Newspaper*), February 10, 1998, discussing the importance of facing this corpus of literature. In the same year, Chen Yingzhen and the editorial group of Renjian publishers attacked the publication of *kominka* literature. Chen and his group proclaimed that they wanted to “organize articles” and fight against the “*Hanjian* literature” (traitors of the Chinese).²⁶ Chen called the Japanization project a “large-scale spiritual brainwash,” one ultimately targeted at uprooting the Chinese subjectivity from Taiwanese people. Under the sway of Japanization, he said, the Taiwanese learned to resent and discard their “Chinese subjectivity” and hence became the

“slaves” of Japan.²⁷ Zeng Jianming echoed Chen’s view and suggested that *kominka* literature was a tool for the colonial government to advocate the Japanese nationalistic and fascist ideals so that Taiwanese people could be mobilized to join the Pacific War.²⁸ Other scholars insisted that Taiwanese local writers of the colonial era, such as Yang Kui, Zhang Wenhuan, and Lyu Heruo, had never fallen into the trap of the Japanization logic. They stressed that Taiwanese writers had always demonstrated a strong spirit of resistance against capitalist imperialism and the colonial government.²⁹

Such intense denial and abjection of the past reminds us that the “inheritance,” as Kobayashi put it, of the Japanese spirit makes the subjective structure a very complex issue.³⁰ It is no longer a rational statement of “who I am,” but a historically conditioned and multilayered structure of subjective feelings that involve ambivalent sadomasochistic impulses and self-abjection. In order to fully understand the complex subjective structures, we need to look into the discursive practices in the Japanese colonial period so that we can uncover the subtle processes of subject formations.

The Formation of the Subject and Psyche Politics

Leo Ching has noted that in order to tackle the colonial discourse with a radical critique, we need to go beyond the mode of discourse that stresses that all communities are “imagined” or that all identities are “historically contingent.” Ching suggests that we examine “the processes and the procedures by which those categories are produced by colonial modernity, and how they are mobilized in turn as a regime of colonial power.” He also notes the mix of longing and loathing of the once-colonized subjects in their relationship to Japan. Ching’s question is intriguing: “Why must Japan’s colonial discourse and practice take the form of interpellating its subjects into becoming Japanese”?³¹

I would like to push this question further and ask what has happened during this process of interpellation. Why was this interpellation so successful that we see, in many colonial-period literary texts, Taiwanese who despise themselves so utterly that they view themselves as, in Zhang Wenhuan’s words, “incomplete men”?³² Why are the ambivalent feelings of the Taiwanese often directed not only against Japan, as Leo Ching suggests, but even more against themselves? Why, in certain extreme cases, would these

Taiwanese even want to die for the emperor voluntarily, as a form of salvation, with a sense of happiness and gratitude? The eagerness and sincerity expressed in the literary texts, as well as in other public discourses, in the volunteering of death is indeed perplexing, but the self-denouncement and abjection is even more so. Can we fully understand the psychic structure of the Taiwanese subject during the colonial period? What took place during the subject formation process?



Kobayashi himself appeared in the book as a reporter-narrator. He interviewed former president Li Denghui and complimented his transformation of the GMD political regime to a nativist-oriented party and said: “The peaceful transfer of political power accomplished by Li Denghui is the best performance of giving up private personal need for the sake of gong so that the nation has a larger space for development.”³³

How does the subject identify himself with the position within the particular symbolic system? Goto Shimpei, the civil administrator who worked

with General Kodama Gentaro (from 1898 to 1906), once stated that the difference between Taiwanese and Japanese is like the difference between flatfish and snapper—one that cannot be easily erased. How can ethnic, linguistic, social, cultural, and political differences be effaced and assimilated into *kominka* sameness for colonial Japanese subjects in Taiwan? Indeed, they cannot, unless the perceived self-identity, the local discourse of the subject, is altered through the subjective intervention of the symbolic equation and exchange of the cultural system. Heideggerian interpretations of identity can help us explain the political economy of psyche politics. Martin Heidegger remarked that, when we say, “A is A,” “A belongs to A,” or “A equals to A,” “A” is no longer “A” itself. This equation requires the intervention of thought and a leap upward onto the *Ge-stell*, a frame set up by the historical conditions.³⁴ The Taiwanese imperial subject in the Japanese colonial condition is established by the equation between an individual and the symbolic national ideology. This Taiwanese imperial subject is not a natural state of being but a discursive construction and naturalization. Such naturalization or the alteration of the self is brought about most successfully through the discourse of immanentism in education.

In the texts used to advocate the meaning of education and its relation to the nation-state as an organic body, Japan is described as a big family, with the emperor as the parent, linking society or the community as an organic totality.³⁵ In the regulations for elementary schools announced by the Education Bureau in 1941, for example, the first rule was to stress the importance of incorporating the spirit of the imperial nation and strengthening loyalty to the national body.³⁶ The metaphor of the nation as an organic body is clearly employed here. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe offered a penetrating observation on the organicity of the community and of the people and stated that it is this organicity that lies beneath the concept of totalitarianism: “It is the organicity of the people, the *Volkstum*, which our concept of ‘nation’, restored to its original meaning, renders reasonably well, in so far as it indicates a natural or ‘physical’ determination of the community which can only be accomplished and revealed to that community by a *technē*—if not indeed by *technē* itself, by art, beginning with language (with the community’s language).”³⁷ Similar theorization of the totalizing governmentality of the nation-state is developed elsewhere, too: “In a word: totalitarianism is

here each time thought as the attempt at a frenzied re-substantialisation — a re-incorporation or re-incarnation, a re-organisation in the strongest and most differentiated sense — of the ‘social body.’”³⁸ Thus, the so-called immanent nature of the community is created through language, through *technē*, through biopolitics, as if the community is an organic artwork. Such a process of self-formation and self-production, according to Lacoue-Labarthe, finds its truth in “a fusion of the community” or in the “ecstatic identification with a Leader” who incarnates “in immanent fashion, the immanentism of a community.”³⁹

As the essential tool in this operation of the subjectivity, the organic and immanent position of the emperor in the national body had to be familiarized first through education. In the textbooks for elementary school, there were lessons in *xiushen* (cultivate oneself), for students to learn self-discipline. Every student had to memorize the educational commandments and bow to the photos of the emperor and empress hung in the hallway of the school. This follows the pattern of the rhetoric of filiality. All subjects in the nation had to serve the emperor with filiality to show their loyalty. Through the repetition of the ritual and the memorization of the text, the process of subjectification, as articulated by Michel Foucault in *The Use of Pleasure*, was completed⁴⁰: “One can practice it, too, because one regards oneself as an heir to a spiritual tradition that one has the responsibility of maintaining or reviving; one can also practice fidelity in response to an appeal, by offering oneself as an example, or by seeking to give one’s personal life a form that answers to criteria of brilliance, beauty, nobility, or perfection.”⁴¹

In *Technologies of the Self*, Foucault further elaborates this concept of subjectification: it is the “technologies of the self” that “permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and ways of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.”⁴² This state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, and immortality is apparently built upon the specific symbolic system the individual is situated in and thus constitutes the position of the subject as an ethical being. It is the kind of relationship one ought to have with oneself, *rappor à soi*, which Foucault calls ethics, and which determines “how the individual is supposed to constitute himself

as a moral subject of his own actions.”⁴³ The mode of self-subjectivation, therefore, tells us why and how the free and autonomous subject would take a certain act to fulfill his life mission.

The discourse of the reconstruction of the psyche of the imperial subject corresponds to Heidegger’s discussion of the technique of the *Ge-stell*, Foucault’s process of subjectification, and Althusser’s metaphor of the bodily logos. This, however, is not enough for the process of subjectification to be complete. There has to be a stage of self-abjection, or the Bataille logic of sacrifice or loss, in the operation of the psyche regime for the path to the *gong*, the nation-state, to be paved. Such a process of self-abjection is easily discerned in Taiwanese literature during the colonial period. One striking feature of these writings is the flood of self-debased bodily images: “unmanliness” and “incompleteness;”⁴⁴ “walking corpse,” “ugly and vulgar;”⁴⁵ images of rotteness, diseased blood, dark and stinking odor within the mouth;⁴⁶ even images of tiny insects trodden in the road, or worms spread across the belly.⁴⁷ In Chen Huoquan’s *The Way (Dao)* we also see the exclamation by the narrator that “islanders are not considered as humankind.”⁴⁸ Such a sense of a wrong, incomplete, diseased, and bad body is felt as the state of abjection, as expelled by the symbolic system, and can be corrected only through a change from the interior, an alteration of the *xin*.

We also encounter in literary writings of the same period a demand to purify the self through blood-cleansing and transcendence, in order to become a “complete” and decent man.⁴⁹ The project involves a voluntary act of cleansing one’s heart, in order to change identity. Kobayashi said, in his graphic history, that Li Denghui demonstrated the perfect spirit of *ziwo zhi si*, the death and sacrifice of the self for the sake of one’s country, and that this is the exact embodiment of the Japanese spirit. In order to become a subject accepted by the state, one has to renounce one’s private self so that one can enter the domain protected by the state. Kobayashi said that the question of “who am I” and “the foundation of my existence” are questions of belongingness and of identity. He wrote: “If there’s no sense of belonging, how can there be any ethical distinction?”⁵⁰ For him, identity, existence, sense of belonging, and ethics only make sense in the context of the state. Consequently, the subject position is a non-I subject, directed toward the aims of the nation-state, that is, the *gong*.⁵¹

Such psyche-cleansing rhetoric is most fully revealed in *The Way*, a novel by Chen Huoquan.⁵² The author, known as a *kominka* writer, demonstrates in his writing a clear effort to rationalize and justify the process of subject formation. He states in the novel that, in order to present the Japanese spirit, it is not enough to lead a Japanese lifestyle; one has to internalize the national spirit through mastery of the national language: “to think with the national language, to speak with the national language, and to write with the national language” so that one can actualize one’s self as a “national subject” and develop one’s life as a national subject.⁵³ The national language mentioned here is not just a matter of formality or a technical problem of governmentality; its discourse has a theological orientation. The national language in this context is described as the “spiritual blood” and endowed with a mythical quality with which the sense of communion is established. The concept that national language is the “spiritual blood” and the “sign of the national body” was proposed by Ueda Kazutoshi in 1894. The educational philosopher Tokieda Motoki even developed the discourse of a “trinity” to define the equivalent relationship among the nation, the people, and the national language: “Now it is the time that the Japanese nation, Japanese people and the Japanese language are ‘three in one body.’”⁵⁴ In this ideological construct, the national language is the spiritual blood of the nation and, through sharing the spiritual blood, the individual can partake of the life of the nation and thus become a national subject. The community of the shared consciousness is consequently formed. The divine nature of the nation is clearly delineated in this discourse of trinity. The symbolic equation of nation, emperor, and god endows the myth of the new nation with a sacred nature. This sacredness of the nation requires the link between the national subject and the spiritual genealogy. The core of the matter, however, is that the ethical subject produced through such a process of subjectification knows how to discern its position within the logos and how to suture the self to the system, as part of the divine body. In Althusser’s words: “If you observe the ‘law of love’ you will be saved, you, Peter, and will become part of the Glorious Body of Christ.”⁵⁵ Chen Huoquan once wrote in an article concerning the Japanese spirit: “The essence of Japanese spirit is the supreme, the central, and the absolute position maintained by the emperor. This spiritual essential ontology is the clear heart.”⁵⁶ The emperor is liter-

ally placed at the core of the national apparatus, as if he were the brain or the heart of the nation. The narrator in *The Way* also said that, in order to become a true national subject, one has to not only believe in Japanese religion and worship the god of the sun,⁵⁷ but also, and most importantly, to efface the unclean parts in one's heart and to give oneself entirely to the emperor. The Bataille logic of sacrifice, or the Kristevan notion of abjection, is clearly at play here. From this viewpoint, while the Pacific War of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere is a holy battle to clear away the barbarians, it is also a battle for the Taiwanese to fight against himself: "to conquer the barbarians for the emperor, and to purify our barbarian hearts, it is the Japanese spirit."⁵⁸ The central metaphor used in this novel, the modern distilling process for camphor, suggests the transformation and sublimation of the interior substance into pure spiritual essence. By this logic, to purify one's heart thus becomes the imperative procedure for the attainment of the Japanese spirit and subsequently the regeneration of a new nation.

Zhang Wenhuan, never labeled as a *kominka* writer but famous for his status as a writer of local color, showed in his essays a similar rhetoric of psyche cleansing and reformation.⁵⁹ He once wrote that the military training to forge an imperial subject and to purify the islanders' consciousness is like the process of water passing through a filter. Filthy water would be "cut off" and become pure water.⁶⁰ Cutting off the past is a necessary act for self-transformation, and cleanliness is the ideal form of the self-image. Zhang's comments on the public and the private demonstrate how the symbolic order had successfully been internalized and served as a principle of self-regulation. He criticized the streets of Taipei as vulgar and chaotic, and suggested that all the geisha houses should be gathered at remote corners rather than being scattered around throughout the city.⁶¹ He also showed his disapproval of the messy conditions in the movie theaters at Dadaocheng, in suburban Taipei. Adults and children eating snacks and melon seeds while watching movies did not fit the Japanese spirit at all, he complained: "How could people not feel ashamed?" Because movies are supposed to teach people how to become imperial subjects, he said, "the audience should be self-reflecting and consider in what postures were they watching the movies."⁶² Zhang, however, wanted more than superficial changes. People should "change not only their external appearance but also their internal spiritual

life.”⁶³ As a famous local writer, his essays, which were published in the newspapers, were influential and helped to direct attention toward the law of the emperor. Such self-discipline and self-observation, under the gaze of the imperial Other, become the ground for the subject, a national subject, an imperial subject.

Gong: Synonym of the Justification for Exclusion



Kobayashi contrasted Japan's invasion against the dictatorship in China under the rules of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, and commented: "If we take the public interest of the totality of Asia into consideration, the invasion into China can be justified. . . . The interest of gong through Japanese occupation can bring better happiness to Asian countries."⁶⁴

What is the desire of the Other? What does the emperor want from me? The Lacanian formulation of the desire of the Other, or the desire of the Other's desire, worked very well here to explain the equation between the

interest of *gong* and the selfless subject-position. The cutting off and effacing of the alien and the heterogeneous elements within oneself is the beginning of the systematic homogenization within the community and the exclusion of the Other. The figure representing Li Denghui in Kobayashi's book says: "If one wants to lead a meaningful life, one has to consider the question of death constantly. It is not physical death but absolute negation of the self."⁶⁵ The effacement and even death of the self, the self that is not yet conformed with the Japanese spirit, that is still mixed with the primitive origin, the Chineseness, and thus less cultivated, is the first step in triggering the process of identification; the logic of the *gong*, the nation or the Japanese spirit, subsequently occupies the locus of the self. The key term here is the "death of the self." We see the lure of the sublime and total destruction behind the façade of the *gong*.



Kobayashi concluded his definition of the concept of "gong" and said: "The nationalism demanded by Japan is for one to forsake the selfish mentality of private interest, to nourish the spirit of 'tianxia wei gong' [the world is our gong], and to take the national interest as the supreme imperative. If we want Japan to lead Asia into the next generation, we have to first retrieve the glory and the awakening of ourselves."⁶⁶

The concept of *gong* and the vision of the greater Asia as depicted in Kobayashi's 2001 graphic book echoes the same sentiments presented in the Taiwanese-colonial discourse. The narrator in Chen Huoquan's novel says:

“Today, in the south, a new nation is being born, and a new mythology is circulating. Except for this moment, when can the six million islanders become the imperial soldiers and obtain our salvation? It is the moment for us to sacrifice our lives for the emperor.”⁶⁷ Chen also stressed that one must be pious and “demolish oneself so that he can forsake everything in the world and leap into the realm of the gods.”⁶⁸ This spiritual leap of faith, Chen explained, would transcend the limitations set up by blood genealogy and would enable the subject to communicate with the Japanese spirit.⁶⁹

Zhang Wenhuan also remarked that what the *bendaoren* (islanders; or Taiwanese) lack is the beauty of rules and constraint within the group. He even expressed the expectation that the order of life shaped by military training could develop into a form of social order.⁷⁰ To Zhang, the nation is like a “machine” that requires its “soul” so that it can start to operate. Japanese spirit, or *yamato tamashii*, is the force to move this machine, and this force can make the Japanese endowed with a “metallic will of perseverance” and make the war “a battle of the soul.”⁷¹ Zhang emphasizes that “it is important first to destroy so that the reconstruction can be possible. The sound of the collapse is pleasurable. Being a man, one cannot shy away. He has to clear away the filth of the old family to rebuild a new one.”⁷² Masculinity is clearly exalted to the level of beauty. To Zhang, it is the responsibility of a man to conduct the task of destruction and reconstruction. “Being a man, it is much better to die in the battlefield than to die in the bed of psycho-neurosis or of illness.” “The passion to join in the battle” belongs to “the will of man.” “The imperial soldiers can demonstrate the scientific and spiritual powers of the Asians and drive away the British and American armies in one night.”⁷³ For him, in order to mobilize the entire population of national subjects, even women have to follow the masculine logic — that is, to serve the nation, carry the same duties as men, show strong maternal love and self sacrifice, and not indulge in vanity.⁷⁴

It is obvious from the above discussion that the discourse of masculinity is associated with the concept of the imperial subject. The weak, the private, the irrational, and the feminine old world are to be denounced, while the strong, the public, the rational, the national, and the masculine new world are to be embraced. Along with this masculinity comes an aestheticization and romanticization of the war. The war is the means to cleanse the world

and to quicken the process of the renewal of the nation. A man should be keenly conscious of his duty as a Japanese, behaving as majestically as, in Zhang Wenhuan's words, a "brand new military ship, flaring up the fire of justice and to beat up the unjust."⁷⁵ In Chen Huoquan's *The Way*, likewise, there is a clear passion for destruction, death, and rebirth: "The longer the war lasts, the more thoroughly each national subject will be incorporated into the totality, and hence the cultural renewal can have its new start."⁷⁶

In a forthright aesthetic analogy, a Japanese philosopher during the war, Yasuda Yojuro, advocated the concept that "war should be viewed as art," as part of Japanese "spiritual culture," and that Japan's invasion of China was the most "magnificent" and "romantic" act of the twentieth century.⁷⁷ Saneatsu Mushanokoji (1885–1976) even praised the aesthetic of sacrifice: "To die in the manner transcending death is the most beautiful death, a death that goes beyond life."⁷⁸ We come to the realization that fascist longings for the sublime beauty of war and of totality were shared by many people from different nations during the first half of the twentieth century and were linked with the logic of double-abjection as the execution of the immanent call.

What Georges Bataille said about the shared experience of the sacred and the accursed remains alarming for us to ponder. What is sacred? Bataille said: "The sacred is only a privileged moment of communal unity, a moment of the convulsive communication of what is ordinarily stifled."⁷⁹ He also said: "To sacrifice is not to kill but to relinquish and to give. Killing is only the exhibition of a deep meaning."⁸⁰ What is underneath the sacrifice and the killing, according to Bataille, is the urge to leave the ordinary daily order, to leap, to give oneself to the deity, like giving coal to the furnace and to burn, so that one experiences the fusion with the totality, a moment of sacredness. Therefore, to give up one's self is to follow the principle of loss and to enter the totality, to partake of the shared duty of the community, through a state of ecstasy.

This logic of sacrifice and expenditure has been powerfully analyzed by Bataille in his study of the psychological structure of fascism.⁸¹ The romantic homogenization into totality, the masculine consciousness, the demand for "a history of blood," and the aestheticization of war and sacrifice all worked together perfectly with the fascist mentality revealed in the Tai-

wanese discourse of the 1940s.⁸² Jewish studies were very popular in Japan at that time, but in a different fashion. In Japan, the English and American armies represented evil and the dark side, while Asians represented the virtuous and bright world.⁸³ The Pacific War was touted as a battle against the poisonous and greedy atmosphere brought on by the English and American people and for the restoration of the healthy order for the people of Asia.

Thus, we see a process of the psyche politics, which moves from the abjection of any private, complex, or contradictory aspects of the self to the internalization and execution of the logic and the will of the *gong*, forging a new identity of the self that is purely externally oriented and that judges its self-worth according to the degree to which it sacrifices all private considerations to the service of the *kominka* project. My reading demonstrates that the writings of Taiwanese authors such as Zhang Wenhuan, Chen Huoquan, and others reflected the contemporary local discursive models of the larger pan-Asian designs of the Japanese colonial *kominka* ideology. This historically concluded process of psyche politics and subject-formation, to our surprise, emerged again as an ongoing structuring force in contemporary Taiwanese society, as observed in the 2001 debates over Kobayashi's book and in the ideological recrudescence in the phrases *Taiwanese heart*, *Taiwanese soul*, or *Taiwanese spirit*, all widely used in contemporary Taiwan. The content of the double structure of *xin* and *gong* of course has changed, but the logic of the psyche politics remains the same. The position of such national subjects serves as the apogee that defines the hierarchy of ethical reasoning and the division of the insiders and outsiders, according to the discursively constructed logic of the *xin*, or the *Ge-stell* of our time. The equation between the *xin* and the *gong*, or the nation, or "native" Taiwanese, or partisanship, structures not only a firmly cohered sense of communion but also a borderline for exclusion. The so-called "green camp" versus "blue camp" opposition between the DPP and GMD (Guomindang) is one typical example. Democratic politics of partisanship follow the same logic of "gong" as the rules of the game. It is actually a politics of hate and defense in the name of love. Whenever the discourse of the psyche functions, loyalty is demanded and compartmentalization begins. Violence can easily ensue for the cause of justice. Such psyche politics explains the recurrent ideological violence in the political discursive field in contemporary Taiwan.

Notes

1. I have developed the concept of “psyche politics” (*xin de zhengzhi*) in my book *Xinde bianyi: Xiandaixing de jingshen xingshi (The Perverted Heart: The Psychological Forms of Modernity)* (Taipei: Rhyfield, 2004), devoted to the investigation of the fascist mentality as revealed in different dimensions of cultural discourses in China and Taiwan during the first half of the twentieth century.
2. These are only representative of numerous cases of similar discourses. For example, Liang Qichao’s theory of New People stressed the importance of a concentrated and powerful psyche force, *xinli*. Sun Zhongshan, in his theory of revolution, also insisted that the minds of the people have to be cured and governed before the nation can be saved. Jiang Jieshi likewise elaborated his theory of the *geming xinfa* (Law of the Heart for Revolution), in his program for the New Life movement in 1934, as a total education for the national citizens. Mao Zedong also once said that he had written an essay on the force of the mind, *xinli shuo*.
3. Masao Maruyama, *Riben Zhengzhi Sixiangshi (Studies on the History of Japanese Political Thoughts)*, trans. Xu Bai and Bao Changlan (Taipei: Shangwu, 1980).
4. Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 2.
5. Nancy, *Inoperative Community*, 3.
6. The terms *Taiwan heart* and *Taiwan soul* have been largely used in recent years to indicate local concern and local spirit. It is the title of a book, *Taiwan xin, Taiwan hun (Taiwan heart, Taiwan soul)*, (He Pan, 1999), written by Du Zhengsheng, a historian and the current minister of education. *Taiwan heart* and *Taiwan soul* were even made into popular songs and were used for political campaigns during the election period. Taiwan Independent Fundamentalist, for example, used Wang Mingzhe’s song “*Taiwan hun*” (Taiwan soul) to call for people’s sense of community. The lyrics of the song are composed by simple phrases such as “zhandou,” “jianguo,” that is, “to battle, to build the nation.” “Our love is faith, and we are willing to sacrifice, and to die as Taiwanese spirit.” See <http://mojim.com/tw43101.htm#10>, (accessed March 31, 2009). The skyscraper Taipei 101 has even been described as the symbol of a “new Taiwan spirit” and “new Taiwan soul,” representing the spirit to march forward, challenge one’s own limit, and seek for excellence. The question “Do you love Taiwan?” has become a test of a person’s loyalty to the nation.
7. I am borrowing Julia Kristeva’s concept of abjection, which she has brilliantly elaborated in her books, including *Powers of Horror* and *Black Sun*. For a more extended discussion of this concept, see Liu, *Xinde bianyi*, chaps. 2–4 and 9.
8. Yoshinori Kobayashi, *On Taiwan (Shin Gōmanism Sengen Supesharu—Taiwan Ron)*, trans. Lai Qingsong and Xiao Zhiqiang (Taipei: Qianwei, 2001).
9. *Ibid.*, 70.

10. *Riben jingshen*, or “Japanese spirit,” is a very loosely used term. Sometimes it is used interchangeably with *yatoma* spirit, “the ways of the warrior” or “the samurai,” meaning a willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the sake of the emperor.
11. The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, formally announced in August 1940, was an attempt by Japan to create a bloc of Asian nations free of influence from Western nations. The rationale behind Japan’s invasion of Okinawa, Korea, China, and Manchuria, consequently, was to safeguard and to defend the “co-prosperity” of East Asian countries against the U.S. and British armies.
12. The Japanese army followed its takeover of Nanjing in 1937 with a series of brutal massacres. According to the official report from the Chinese government, around three hundred thousand people were killed.
13. The reactions in China to Kobayashi’s book were actually a follow-up to protests against a textbook event, in which the Japanese Education Bureau modified the details of the wartime history in textbooks. The *Diary in the Army* kept by Azuma Shiro that recorded detailed descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre revived the heated resentment from the Chinese public. Series of debates on this issue also appeared in *Dushu* magazine in 2000.
14. See forums.chinatimes.com.tw/special/Taiwan_women/china.htm (accessed March 31, 2009).
15. Numerous essays appeared in newspapers and on the Web, and two volumes collecting these debates have been published: *Taiwan lun fengbao* (*The Storm of Yoshinori Kobayashi’s On Taiwan*) (Taipei: Qianwei, 2001), and *Sanjiaozai: Taiwan lun and huangminhua pipan* (*The Three-Legged Person: The Komin Faces in Yoshinori Kobayashi’s On Taiwan*) (Taipei: Haixia Xueshu, 2002).
16. For example, see forums.chinatimes.com/special/Taiwan_women/main.htm (accessed March 31, 2009).
17. On the Web site for World United Formosans for Independence, several articles directly stated their support for Kobayashi and believed that he had understood and presented Li Denghui correctly. See, for example: www.wufi.org.tw/republic/rep11-20/n018_07.htm (accessed March 31, 2009); www.wufi.org.tw/republic/rep11-20/n018_05.htm (accessed March 31, 2009).
18. Japanese scholar Marukawa Tetsushi published a collection of critical essays in 2001, addressing the fascist and right-wing mentality in Kobayashi’s *On Taiwan* and positing that his nostalgia was rooted in his father’s generation, circa the 1940s. The Association for Cultural Studies in Taiwan organized a forum for the writers of this book; the discussion has been recorded at www.ncu.edu.tw/~eng/csa/journal/journal_forum_6.htm (accessed March 31, 2009).
19. Kobayashi, *On Taiwan*, 90.
20. *Ibid.*, 39.

21. Ibid., 90.
22. Li Denghui planned to make his visit to Japan on November 23, 2002, to lecture on Japanese spirit. The Japanese government, however, refused to issue him a visa, forcing him to cancel the trip.
23. Li Denghui, *Wushidao Jieti (Interpretations of Bushido)* (Taipei: Qianwei, 2004).
24. Jin Meiling and Zhou Yingming, *Ribenah, Taiwanah (Oh, Japan! Oh, Taiwan)*, trans. Zhang Liangzhe (Taipei: Qianwei, 1998), 153.
25. Ibid., 152.
26. Chen Yingzhen, Zeng Jianmin, Lyu Zhenghui, and Lin Xiaoxin, “Editorial Statement,” in *Taiwan xiangtu wenxue, huangmin wenxue de qingli yu pipan (Taiwan Local Literature and Kominaka Literature: Examination and Critique)* (Taipei: Renjian, 1998), 1–2.
27. Ibid., 10–11.
28. Zeng Jianmin, Taiwan huangmin wenxue de zongqingsuan,” in *Taiwan Xiangtu Wenxue: Huangmin Wenxue Zongqingsuan* (Taipei: Renjian, 1998), 36.
29. See, for example, Lü, Zhenghui, “Zhimindi de Shanghen” (“Wounds of the Colonial Land”), in *Zhimindi jingyan yu Taiwan wenxue (Colonial Experience and Taiwanese Literature)*, ed. Jiang Zide (Taipei: Yuanliu, 2000), 45–62; Chen Jianzhong, “Paihuai Buqu de Zhiminzhuyi Yiuling” (“The Undispersed Phantom of Colonialism”) *Lianhe*, July 8–9, 1998; Yiu Shengguan, “Zhuanxiang? Haishi Fanzhimin Lichang de Jianchi?” (“Conversion? Or the Insistence of the Anticolonial Position?”) (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Zhang Wenhuan and His Contemporaries, National Museum of Taiwanese Literature, October 18–19, 2003).
30. Chen Guangxin once pointed out that “the ineffaceable memories and imaginations of the Japanese colonial experience undoubtedly has become an important component in the construction of Taiwanese Subjectivity.” See www.bp.ntu.edu.tw/WebUsers/taishe/frm_twl_chenguangxing.htm (accessed March 31, 2009). This statement is true, but we need to be aware that the distinction between *benshengren* (people who immigrated to Taiwan before 1945) and *waishengren* (people who immigrated to Taiwan after 1945) has become an overly simplified umbrella term. There are diverse subjective positions among people of both groups.
31. Leo T. S. Ching, *Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 5.
32. Zhang Wenhuan, “Yiqun gezi” (A Group of Doves), in *Zhang Wenhuan quanji* (Complete Collection of Zhang Wenhuan’s Writings), ed. Chen Wanyi (Taizhong, Taiwan: Cultural Center of Taizhong County, 2003), 104.
33. Kobayashi, *On Taiwan*, 38.
34. Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stabaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 23–27.

35. Such notions of education were stated, for example, in the *Essential Meaning of the National Body*, issued in 1937, and distributed to every school and educational institution throughout the nation.
36. “National Body” is a concept largely used by Japanese philosophers during the first half of the twentieth century. See Du Wuzhi, *Educational System in the Japanese Colonial Period* (Taipei: Cultural Center of Taipei County, 1997), and Chen Peifeng’s essay on the function of national language, “Zouxiang yishitongren de ribenminzu zhi Dao” (“The ‘Way’ That Leads toward Equality of Japanese People”) (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Taiwanese Literary History, Cheng-gong University, Tainan, November 22–24, 2002).
37. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “The Aestheticization of Politics,” in *Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*, trans. Chris Turner (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 69.
38. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, “The ‘Retreat’ of the Political,” in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, *Retreating the Political*, ed. Simon Sparks (London: Routledge, 1997), 127.
39. Lacoue-Labarthe, “Aestheticization of Politics,” 70.
40. Michel Foucault, “Introduction to ‘The Use of Pleasure,’” in *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 2:5–6.
41. Foucault, *Use of Pleasure*, 2:27.
42. Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (London: Tavistock, 1988), 18.
43. Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” (an interview with Michel Foucault by Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus, 1983), in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*, vol. 1, *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 2006), 263.
44. Zhang Wenhuan, “Yiqun gezi” (A Group of Doves) (1942) in Zhang Wenhuan *quanji* (*Complete Collection of Zhang Wenhuan’s Writings*), ed. Chen Wanyi (Taizhong: Cultural Center of Taizhong County, 2003), 1:104. This collection hereafter cited as *ZWQ*.
45. Long Yingzong, “Zhiyi muguashu de xiaozhen” (1937) (“A Village Planted with Papaya Trees”), in *Long Yingzong quanji* (*Collections of Long Yingzong’s Writings*) (Taipei: Qianwei, 1990), 48, 61.
46. Zhou Jinpo, “Shuiyan,” (“Blood Cancer”) (1941) in *Zhou Jinpo quanji* (*Collections of Zhou Jinpo*) (Taipei: Qianwei, 2002), 5–6.
47. Long, “Zhiyi Muguashu de Xiaozhen,” 70.
48. Chen Huoquan, *Dao* (*The Way*), *Taiwan Wenyi* (*Taiwan Literary*) 6 (1943): 27.
49. Zhang Wenhuan, “Taiwan: The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier,” in *ZWQ*, 1:158.
50. Kobayashi, *On Taiwan*, 58.

51. Kôsaka Masaaki, Suzuki Shigetaka, Kôyama Iwao, and Nishitani Keiji, "Sekaishiteki tachiba to Nibon" ("The Standpoint of World History and Japan"), *Chûô Kôron* (January, 1942): 185. Quoted in Naoki Sakai, "Modernity and Its Critique: The Problem of Universalism and Particularism," in *Translation and Subjectivity: On "Japan" and Cultural Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 167. Naoki Sakai had discussed how Kôyama and Kôsaka expressed the same arguments in the forum in 1941 that all moral action is defined by the nation, and that a nation cannot determine its future unless it maintains its subjectivity.
52. Chen Huoquan (1908–99) was born in Lu Gang. He entered the Camphor Factory in 1934 and was awarded for his invention of the new distillation method in 1941. What he described in *The Way* was more or less his biographical account.
53. Chen Huoquan, *The Way*, 33.
54. Tokieda Motoki, "Japanese Language Policy in Korea," *Japanese Language* 2 (1942). Quoted in Komagome Takeshi, *The Cultural Totality under the Colonial Imperial Japan* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 335.
55. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in *Visual Culture: The Reader*, ed. Jessica Evans and Stuart Hall (London: Thousand Oaks; and New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1999), 321–22.
56. Chen Huoquan, "Qinlao fu" ("Song of Diligence"), in the journal of *Taiwan Monopoly Bureau* 1939, the publication by the government agency during the Japanese colonial period, that was in charge of the enterprise of liquor, opium, and camphor, where Chen Huoquan was employed; quoted in Tarumi Chie, *Taiwan Literature Written in Japanese* (Taipei: Qianwei, 1998), 79.
57. According to Japanese mythology, the sun god (Amaterasu-o-mi-kami) is the ancestor of the royal family, a line that has lasted for many centuries. The fact that the emperor is said to be the true descendent of the god of sun stabilizes the sacredness of the nation and also the position of the emperor.
58. Chen Huoquan, *The Way*, 21.
59. In 1941, Zhang Wenhuan (1909–78) founded the quarterly magazine *Taiwan Wenxue* (*Taiwan Literature*), which lasted for two years and six months. His play *Yanji* (*Castrated Chicken*) was put on stage in 1934 and was very popular. Although Zhang has been described as an anticolonial writer, a close reading of his work reveals a very clear proemperor stance, a position common at the time.
60. Zhang Wenhuan, "Ranshao de liang" ("Burning Power") (1943), in *ZWQ*, 1:176.
61. Zhang Wenhuan, "Dadaocheng zagan" ("Thoughts on Dadaocheng") (1938), in *ZWQ*, 1:21–22.
62. Zhang, "Thoughts on Dadaocheng," in *ZWQ*, 1:25.
63. Ibid.
64. Kobayashi, *On Taiwan*, 90.

65. Ibid., 39.
66. Ibid., 59.
67. Chen Huoquan, *The Way*, 40.
68. Ibid., 23–24.
69. Ibid., 31.
70. Zhang, “Burning Power,” in *ZWQ*, 1:176.
71. Zhang Wenhuan, “Taiwan: The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier,” in *ZWQ*, 1:158.
72. Zhang Wenhuan, “A Group of Doves,” in *ZWQ*, 1:104.
73. Ibid. A similar urge for masculinity and manhood during wartime can also be seen in Zhou Jinpo, “Zhiyuanbing,” (“Volunteer”), in *Zhou Jinpo quanji*, 13–36; Zhang Wenhuan, “Sanzhong xiyue” (“Three Types of Joy”), in *ZWQ*, 1:67; and Zhou Jinpo, “Guanyu Zhengbingzhi” (“Concerning the Conscription System”), in *Zhou Jinpo quanji*, 236–37.
74. Zhang Wenhuan, “On the Question of Women,” in *ZWQ*, 1:122.
75. Zhang Wenhuan, “Letter to Korean Writers,” in *ZWQ*, 1:190.
76. Chen Huoquan, *The Way*, 35. Such a masculine tone and joyful embrace of the war reminds us of Guo Moruo’s futurist remarks in the journals established by the Creation Society during the late 1920s in China. For example, see Guo Moruo, “Taiyang lizan” (“Worship for the Sun”) in *Guo Moruo quanji (Complete Works of Guo Moruo)* (Beijing: Renmin, 1982), 1:100. A similar tone also appeared in the right-wing nationalist articles in *Qianfeng zazhi (The Avant-garde)* in the 1920s in China.
77. Yasuda Yojuro, quoted in Xiang-yuan Wang, *Bibudui he Qinhuo Zhanzheng (Pen Army and the Invasion of China)* (Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 1999), 11–14.
78. Saneatsu Mushanokoji, quoted in *ibid.*, 17.
79. Georges Bataille, “The Sacred,” in *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927–1939*, ed. and intro. Allan Stoekl, trans. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 242.
80. Georges Bataille, “Sacrifice, the Festival, and the Principles of the Sacred World,” in *Theory of Religion*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 49.
81. Georges Bataille, “The Psychological Structure of Fascism,” in *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927–1939*, ed. Allan Stoekl, trans. Allan Stoekl, Carl R. Lovitt, and Donald M. Leslie Jr. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 122–46.
82. The phrase “a history of blood” is from Chen Huoquan, *The Way*, 40.
83. See, for example, Yang Weili, *Shuang-Xiang Ji (A Tale of Two Homes)*, trans. Chen Yingzhen (Taipei: Renjian, 1995), 99–117.

Immanentism, Double Abjection, and the Politics of Psyche in (Post)Colonial Taiwan

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This essay discusses what I define as the psyche politics employed in the discourse of identity and of subjectivity in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period (1895–1945), and how the use of such politics of psyche recurred in postcolonial Taiwan, especially in the discourse of the nativized Taiwanese subject of the recent decades under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government (1990s to 2008). I use *psyche politics* to refer to the discursive operations of molding, shaping, fashioning, policing, and governing of the interior essence of life.

Through analyzing the discursive event triggered by Yoshinori Kobayashi's graphic history *On Taiwan*, (Shin Gōmanism Sengen Supesharu—Taiwan Ron) which appeared in 2001, and the discourse of self-effacement and self-abjection present in many literary texts, cultural policies, and public opinions during the Japanese colonial period, I point out that the discursive self-abjection, or the will to cleanse the uncleanness of one's heart, maneuvered and coerced through cultural regime, is indispensable for the formation of a non-I subject. More significantly, the discourse of the *gong*, the reverse side of the self-abjection, sets the frame of the spiritual totality to be shared by the individuals as parts of the whole. The two symbiotic states, self-abjection and the participation within the *gong*, constructed a particular mode of discourse of the psyche in East Asia during the Pacific War and paved the way for the frame of consciousness of the modern nation-state as well as the ground for subjectivation. Through such a

discursive mode of psyche politics, a certain sense of community is engineered. We observe that the function of abjection operates in double directions: the internal effacement and the external exclusion. The locus of the *gong*, defined variously according to different contexts, which is often erected in the name of love in order to uphold the sense of community, paradoxically also serves the cause for cruelty and abjection against difference, both outside and inside the community.

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