

108學年度台灣聯合大學系統
亞際文化研究國際碩士學位學程
(國立交通大學、國立清華大學、國立中央大學)
招生入學筆試

類組：文化研究類

考試時間：108年3月29日，11:00-12:00

考試說明：共兩題，作答時間一小時。第一題所有考生必考，第二題是四大領域之「專業科目」選考。

I. 必考題 Required Question

以下兩段文章均討論了感覺的社會性。請譯為中文，並比較兩者立場之異同。

“What does it mean for the struggle to shape collective life when a politics of true feeling organizes analysis, discussion, fantasy, and policy? When feeling, the most subjective thing, the thing that makes persons public and marks their location, takes the temperature of power; mediates personhood, experience, and history; takes over the space of ethics and truth? When the shock of pain is said only to produce clarity when shock can as powerfully be said to produce panic, misrecognition, the shakiness of perception’s ground?”
--Lauren Berlant, “The Subject of True Feeling.”

“We are talking about characteristic elements of impulse, restraint, and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity. We are then defining these elements as a 'structure': as a set, with specific internal relations, at once interlocking and in tension. Yet we are also defining a social experience which is still in process, often indeed not yet recognized as social but taken to be private, idiosyncratic, and even isolating, but which in analysis (though rarely otherwise) has its emergent, connecting, and dominant characteristics, indeed its specific hierarchies.”
--Raymond Williams, “Structures of Feeling.”

II. Specialization Question 主修領域之「專業科目」測驗

請選擇您的主修領域擇一作答：

【A.批判理論與亞洲現代性】

The expression “relating to the world” itself demonstrates the extent to which we are, so to speak, *alienated*. The ecological crisis is often presented as the eternally renewed discovery that “man belongs to nature” – a seemingly simple expression that is actually very obscure (and not only because “man” is obviously also “woman”). Is it a way of talking about humans who finally understand that they are part of a “natural world” to which they must learn to conform? In the Western tradition, in fact, most definitions of the human stress the extent to which it is *distinguished* from nature. This is what is meant, most often, by the notions of “culture,” “society,” or “civilization.” As a result, every time we attempt to “bring humans closer to nature,” we are prevented from doing so by the objection that a human is above all, or is also, a cultural being who has to escape from, or in any case be *distinguished* from, nature. Thus we shall never be able to say too crudely of humans “that they belong to nature.” Moreover, if human beings were truly “natural,” and only that, they would be deemed no longer human at all but only “material objects” or “pure animals” (to us even more ambiguous expressions).

— Bruno Latour, *Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime*

請翻譯上述英文段落，並簡短說明目前批判理論界如何重新看待文化/自然區分的思想傳統。

[B.性/別研究]

Please read carefully the following passage. Firstly, identify what the main problematics and political stakes are concerning the author’s critique of “Queer Theory” vis-à-vis “Marriage Equality” in terms of legal institution, the privileged framing of nation-state, and geohistorical unevenness of knowledge production across varied geographies and forms of historical development. Having first identified the issues and stakes in this quoted passage, you may then draw on examples from specific contexts of your choice to further engage with the author’s ideas and critiques.

“The title for this symposium, “Queer Theory after ‘Marriage Equality,’” suggests a distinct social and historical event and changed context that queer theory must pause for, grapple with, and perhaps even rethink itself in relation to. I understand “marriage equality” as naming the US legal institutional movement that sought state and federal marriage contracts, with their associated rights and recognitions, for same-sex couples who otherwise already possess legal standing with the state, such as US citizens and some permanent residents. Indeed, though “same-sex” marriage is legal in twenty-two countries, it has not always been understood in terms of marriage equality or achieved through

legal movements and juridical power (in postcolonial Ireland, for instance, it was won through popular referendum rather than litigation).¹ And, importantly, no other place used or appropriated a modern constitutional amendment for the abolition of slavery, in this case the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, to make a claim to and for state power and recognition. In this manner, we ought to take as a first meaning of “queer theory after marriage equality” the naming and alerting us to the continued racialized geohistorical unevenness of queer theory and its knowledges. For even as we ask what it means to do queer theory after marriage equality, we ought not to presume to know already the time in which we are working and thinking. Indeed, marriage equality already institutes us into a temporality that privileges those subjects, objects, and epistemologies that naturalize the nation-state as a rational development of a globally universal historical time (Gopinath 2005; Manalansan 2003). To precritically orient the “time” of queer theory to marriage equality operates as a disavowal of what we do not know of other polities globally and the transnational conditions constitutive of but obscured by national historical time. And it forecloses a reckoning with how the privileging of particular methods, critical foundations, and institutional epistemologies are the conditions for our knowing and “unknowing” of the varied geographies, peoples, and histories within which queer theory pursues its critiques of modern “sexuality” (Najmabadi 2013; Rofel 2007; Ferguson 2003; Povinelli 2006).² To engage with those cultural formations and subjects that are felicitously abandoned or cannot be known through mere inclusion in or extension of these foundations and epistemologies can be one understanding of queer theory. If there is uncertainty about what it means to do queer theory in the academy after marriage equality in the United States, such hesitation can lead to rich immanent critiques, a destabilization of the institutionalization of our proper objects of study, and a renewed curiosity about the constitutive geographies, peoples, and contingent histories and formations that we do not know, as queer studies pursues its institutional space among the disciplines and interdisciplines.”

[C. 當代思潮與社會運動]

2014 年發生的太陽花學運（又稱三一八學運），在當時震撼了台灣社會，並引起國內外媒體的關注。

1. 這場運動是否反映了某種思潮或是某種動能？
 2. 這場運動是否改變了什麼？或是形成某種不同於以往的社會關係或集體心態？
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[D. 視覺文化]

請解釋何為 haptic visuality 和 haptic images，並舉例說明。亦請解釋這裡所描述的觀看關係，與傳統女性主義電影理論分析古典好萊塢電影的觀看關係，有何差異。

“Haptic *perception* is usually defined as the combination of tactile, kinesthetic, and proprioceptive functions, the way we experience touch both on the surface of and inside our bodies. In haptic *visuality*, the eye themselves function like organs of touch. Haptic visuality, a term contrasted to

optical visibility, draws from other forms of sense experience, primarily touch and kinesthetics. Because haptic visibility draws on other senses, the viewer's body is more obviously involved in the process of seeing than is the case with optical visibility. The difference between haptic and optical visibility is a matter of degree, however. In most processes of seeing both are involved, in a dialectical movement from far to near, from solely optical to multisensory. And obviously we need both kinds of visibility: it is to look closely at a lover's skin with optical vision; it is hard to drive a car with haptic vision."

"The term haptic *visibility* emphasizes the viewer's inclination to perceive haptically, but a work itself may offer haptic *images*. Haptic images do not invite identification with a figure so much as they encourage a bodily relationship between the viewer and the image. Thus it is less appropriate to speak of the object of a haptic look than to speak of a dynamic subjectivity between looker and image."

--Laura Marks, *Touch: Sensory Theory and Multisensory Media*, 2-3.